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network links (e.g., routers). Yet, none of the countermeasures to link flooding pro-
posed to date have provided dependable link access (i.e., link access guarantees)
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protection against link flooding by authorizing individual flows with unforgeable
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vulnerable to flooding attacks that prevent legitimate clients from acquiring capa-
bilities; i.e., Denial of Capability (DoC) attacks, (2) compromised attack sources
that have acquired capabilities in a legitimate way can flood the privileged channel
reserved for capability carrying packets, and (3) the global effects of flooding attacks
are still unavoidable with “per-flow” based capabilities.
In this dissertation, we present a router-level design that confines the effects
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design provides differential guarantees for access to network links that favor packets
from uncontaminated domains by attack sources (e.g., bots) and yet do not deny
access to packets from contaminated domains. For connection-request packets (i.e.,
capability requests), differential access guarantees are defined as the probabilistic
lower bounds for link access: requests from uncontaminated domains have higher
probabilistic lower bounds for link access than those from contaminated domains.
For all other packets, differential access guarantees are defined in terms of the the
bandwidth allocated to packet flows; i.e., flows of malware-uncontaminated domains
receive higher bandwidth guarantees than flows of contaminated ones, and legiti-
mate flows of contaminated domains are guaranteed substantially higher bandwidth
than attack flows. Potential side-effects of attack flows (e.g., multiple congested
links) are mitigated by a differential routing scheme, whereby flows of malware-
uncontaminated domains are routed through less congested paths while those of
contaminated domains are routed through the “pinned” default paths.
We present analytical models for the proposed notions of dependable link
access, and evaluate our router design both by comprehensive simulations under
different attack scenarios and by comparisons with other flooding-defense schemes.
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It is generally understood that DDoS attacks that flood Internet services require
end-to-end solutions; i.e., absence of flooding in the underlying network links is in-
sufficient to guarantee service access [Gli05]. It is equally well-understood that denial
of service is not an end-to-end solvable problem; e.g, DDoS attacks that flood public
services cannot be countered without handling flooding attacks at the network layer.
Yet, most proposed solutions that attempt to provide service-access guarantees de-
spite flooding attacks assume the existence of flood-free network links – a non-trivial
assumption that has not been satisfied in the Internet to date. Traditional tech-
niques for handling such flooding attacks at the network layer, including IP trace-
backs [SP01,SWKA00,Bel00,YPS03,Goo02], IP ingress/egress filtering [Fer00], and
legal/administrative remedies, though useful, are insufficient. For example, service-
access requests can originate from zombies or bots that issue protocol-conforming
requests from legitimate IP addresses and remote Internet locations outside ju-
risdictions that can deter flooding attacks. Hence, these attacks can evade most
traditional techniques.
Handling flooding attacks against network links requires different solutions
1
from those at the application layer for at least two reasons. First, the typical mech-
anisms used at the application layer (e.g., mechanisms based on efficiently-verifiable
request authenticity, on proof of work [ANL00,WR03,WVB+06], on proof of valid
request scheduling [Gli05], on proof of human presence [vABHL03]) are imprac-
tical at this layer. Second, application layer mechanisms provide only very weak
guarantees of access during flooding attacks as they are (at best linearly) depen-
dent on the number global of attack sources [ANL00,Gli05,WR03,WVB+06]. This
undesirable dependency cannot be removed by any of the network-layer defenses pro-
posed to date. For example, recent “capability” based solutions, whereby distinct
packet flows are separately authorized by capabilities obtained before flows are ini-
tiated [ARW03,YPS04,YWA05], cannot offer access guarantees because large-scale
attacks (e.g., 1 – 2 million attack sources) can flood most chosen links with packets
containing requests to obtain capabilities. And, in the absence of strong user/client
authentication, zombies or bots can acquire capabilities for a target link and flood
the link in a legitimate manner. Naturally, if link-access guarantees that are inde-
pendent on the number of global attack sources cannot be obtained, then strong
guarantees of access via network-layer capabilities become impossible.
Solutions that remove the strong flooding-freedom dependency on critical net-
work links to a service (e.g., by providing many network links to the service and
distributing flows randomly among them), such as SOS [KMR02] and its descen-
dants [SCM+05,SK05,And03], require network overlays for specific web servers with
distributed access points that authenticate client requests. Though useful, these so-
lutions do not aim at providing access guarantees for individual network links. Such
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guarantees would still be necessary for Internet infrastructure and other public ser-
vices, for instance, which cannot authenticate remote requests (e.g., authentication
servers themselves, domain name servers).
The central problem we address in this dissertation is that of “localization”
of flooding attacks against network links. That is, we seek to provide guarantees of
network-link access that depend only on attack sources in defined locales or neighbor-
hoods (e.g., a local administrative domain or a set of domains in the Internet) and
not on all possible attack sources. As a consequence, competing flows to flooded
links that originate outside a contaminated locale should be unaffected, or only
minimally affected, by a flooding attack. Hence, they should get better guarantees
of network-link access than flows of contaminated domains. In effect, we seek to
provide differential guarantees for network-link access that favor flows from admin-
istrative domains that are uncontaminated with attack sources instead of uniform
but very weak guarantees.
In this dissertation, we present a router-level scheme that provide (1) con-
nection setup guarantees for network capabilities, (2) bandwidth guarantees for
legitimate flows carrying capabilities, and (3) route diversity for legitimate flows.
3
1.1 Dependable Connection Setup for Network
Capabilities
Recent service-flooding attacks used a large number of compromised machines or-
ganized as a “bot” networks. Typical defense mechanisms that attempt to provide
service-access guarantees despite such attacks assume absence of flooding in the un-
derlying network links. Yet, a large scale attack (e.g., a “botnet” with millions of
“bots”) can flood any chosen link in the Internet. In particular, defense mechanisms
deployed at links near or at a network edge (e.g., Firewalls, IDSs) can be easily over-
whelmed by such attacks. Worse yet, “legitimate-looking” attack packets can evade
most of traditional techniques for handling address spoofing attacks at the network
layer (e.g., IP tracebacks, ingress filtering).
“Capability” based solutions, whereby distinct packet flows are separately au-
thorized by capabilities obtained before flow initiation [ARW03, YPS04, YWA05,
YWA08], provide congested routers with an effective way to prioritize legitimate
flows and filter out unwanted traffic. Though promising, these solutions are still
vulnerable to flooding attacks targeting the capability-setup channel, known as the
Denial of Capability (DoC) attacks [AC05b]. These attacks are possible because the
initial capability-request packets are treated as “best-delivery-effort” packets, as op-
posed to the subsequent high-priority packets that carry capabilities. If DoC attacks
cannot be countered, flow authorization via network-layer capabilities becomes im-
possible, and all access guarantees become meaningless at congested routers.
Previous solutions that attempt to protect capability requests from flooding
4
attacks (e.g., mechanisms based on aggregate request rates [YWA08] or on proof of
work [PWS+07]), though useful, are insufficient to provide dependable link-access
guarantees for legitimate capability requests. For example, a fair-queueing mech-
anism, which allocates buffer space to flow aggregates fairly based on a router’s
confidence on precise identification of traffic origin [YWA05,YWA08], fails to pro-
vide any guarantee of link-access (viz., Section 2.7.1). Mechanisms based on proof
of work (e.g., Portcullis [PWS+07]) provide only very weak guarantees of access
during flooding attacks as they are (at best linearly) dependent on the number
of global attack sources; e.g., a large number of “bots” could still flood a chosen
link despite such guarantees. More sophisticated application-layer solutions (e.g.,
CAPTCHA [vABHL03]) that attempt to distinguish between human- and machine-
initiated traffic to prevent flooding attacks are impractical at the network-link level.
Our Contributions. The central problem addressed in Chapter 2 is that
of providing dependable access guarantees for the capability setup channel, namely
for initial capability requests, during flooding attacks against routers. To be mean-
ingful, these guarantees have to be independent of the number of attack sources
(i.e., the size of a global “botnet”). In the worst case, they can only depend on
attack sources in defined locales or neighborhoods (e.g., a local administrative do-
main or a set of domains in the Internet). As a consequence, competing requests for
a capability to a flooded link that originate outside a contaminated locale should
be unaffected, or only minimally affected, by a flooding attack, and should receive
strong access guarantees. In contrast, initial capability requests originating from
“bot”-contaminated locales could receive weaker access guarantees, namely guaran-
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tees that depend only on the number of “bots” in the contaminated locale (but not
on all “bots” of a multi-domain attack network). In short, our notion of depend-
able access to a flooded link provides differential guarantees for the capability setup
channel. Such guarantees are possible because the distribution of attack sources
in the Internet are highly non-uniform: some domains include sufficiently strong
security mechanisms that enable them to counter or deter contamination; others are
easily contaminated by “bots.” Non-uniform distribution of attack sources is evi-
dent in a variety of worm propagation models [SPW02,DZL06,RMT06,RZMT06],
evolutionary features of previous worms such as CodeRed I/II, Nimda and Slammer.
Differential access guarantees are desirable because they provide incentives for em-
ploying host security measures within administrative domains that prevent “botnet”
(and other malware) contamination. In exchange, uncontaminated domains receive
precise guarantees of link access for the capability setup channel, which support
meaningful network-link and, ultimately, service-access guarantees.
Our scheme for providing dependable access guarantees for initial capability
requests relies on three basic mechanisms. First, we define a new “path identi-
fication” mechanism that provides an unforgeable domain identifier to individual
packets, and enables remote routers to identify a packet’s domain of origin. Sec-
ond, we define a “dynamic virtual queueing” mechanism that guarantees a minimum
number of router buffer slots to domains originating flows through a router, which in
effect, guarantees link access to those domains. Finally, we employ a “path aggrega-
tion” mechanism that allocates router bandwidth to capability requests depending
on domain contamination and maximizes service to legitimate capability requests.
6
1.2 Dependable Link Access for Legitimate Traf-
fic
“Capability” schemes [ARW03, YPS04, YWA05] have aimed to provide identifier
authenticity for individual flows via router-generated unforgeable identifiers (i.e.,
capabilities) created during the connection setup phase. These schemes effectively
prevent identifier (IP address) spoofing and filter unauthorized traffic by making use
of strong source-authorization rules applied at a network edge (e.g., by IDSs, Fire-
walls). Flow-identifier authenticity, though effective in preventing address-spoofing
attacks, is insufficient to counter link-flooding attacks, for much the same reason as
other per-flow defense schemes; e.g., a large “bot network” could acquire capabilities
in a legitimate manner and then flood a targeted link. Such an attack would grow
in strength at least linearly with the number of bots, and would have global side
effects: legitimate flows could be denied access through the targeted link. Without
controlling aggregate flow rates at network links, a capability scheme cannot counter
link-flooding attacks. For example, application-server supplied bounds on the router
bandwidth made available by a network capability to a packet flow [YWA05] cannot
(and is not intended to) guarantee link access since these bounds cannot control the
aggregate flow rates at that router in a “bot attack”.
In handling link-flooding attacks, most router-based methods proposed to
date attempt to identify either attack flows or flow aggregates (i.e., sets of flows
with defined characteristics) and penalize them in a specific manner. For ex-
ample, a variety of preferential packet-dropping methods work on a per-flow ba-
7
sis [MFW01, FKSS01, PPP00, XG06], where a flow is identified by its source and
destination IP addresses. Other methods, such as Pushback [MBF+02], identify the
“flow aggregates” contributing to congestion, and control their rates by installing
filters close to, or at, flow origins. Flow- and aggregate-based flooding defenses
have complementary strengths depending on the types of attacks being launched.
For example, a flow-based defense can limit the bandwidth of individual aggressive
(i.e., attack) flows very effectively [XG06], yet it is ineffective for defending against
large-scale attacks comprising multiple low-rate flows launched from multiple, bot-
contaminated hosts – a situation in which an aggregate-based defense is needed.
However, aggregate-based defenses fail to limit “collateral damage” within flow ag-
gregates; i.e., they may deny link access to legitimate packet flows within attack
aggregates [MBF+02, XG05, CLSS08]. In principle, integrating salient features of
both types of flooding-defense mechanisms can produce practical countermeasures.
Our Contributions. In Chapter 3, we present a router-based subsystem
called FLoc (Flow Localization) that confines collateral damage of link-flooding
attacks within specified packet-flow “locales,” namely flows of single domains (Au-
tonomous Systems, ASs) or specific sets of domains, and provides (1) link-access
(i.e., bandwidth) guarantees on a per domain basis, and (2) fair bandwidth alloca-
tion for individual flows within a domain.
FLoc distinguishes between the flows (and flow aggregates) of bot-contaminated
and uncontaminated domains. This distinction is possible for two reasons. First,
the distribution of host contamination with “malware” in the Internet is highly non-
uniform [SPW02,RMT06,DZL06,CG05,CJB08]: domains that employ sufficiently
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strong security mechanisms and policies for individual hosts are less likely to be con-
taminated with malware (including attack “bots”) than others. Second, legitimate
(i.e., non-attack) flows originating from uncontaminated domains have more homo-
geneous congestion characteristics, such as mean packet-drop rates, than flows of
contaminated domains. This enables FLoc to identify attack flows of contaminated
domains and confine their effects to those domains. It also enables FLoc to provide
differential bandwidth guarantees at a congested link, in two ways: (1) uncontam-
inated domains receive better bandwidth guarantees than contaminated domains;
and (2) legitimate flows of contaminated domains are guaranteed substantially more
bandwidth than attack flows. FLoc provides differential bandwidth guarantees by
two complementary rate-control policies, namely, an intra-domain preferential drop
policy and inter-domain, path-identifier aggregation policy. Both are discussed in
Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 in detail.
1.3 Collaborative Defense for Mitigating Attack
Effects
Rate limiting and filtering attack traffic are two fundamental ways of defending
link-flooding DoS attacks, yet precise identification of attack flows and placement
of filters determine their effectiveness. Ideally, filters are desired to be located near
the origin of attack flows in order to prevent attack traffic from being injected
deep into the Internet. However, such near source filtering raises some issues: on
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receiving a rate-control request from a congested router/domain, a source domain
(stub/provider) needs to limit its customers’ traffic on others’ behalf, and it cannot
easily validate the legitimacy of the rate-control request (e.g., authenticity, fair
bandwidth allocation).
As an alternative to “restrictive” source-end rate-control, a “promotive” rout-
ing approach can be considered in defending flooding attacks, where source domains
(that originate legitimate flows) reroute the flows destined to a flooded link to avoid
severely congested paths. It is promotive because employing rerouting offers tangible
benefit (e.g., higher bandwidth, lower delay) to the flows of participating domains.
However, during link-flooding attacks, traditional approaches to diversifying traffic
routes, which aim for load balancing, congestion avoidance, or secure path selection,
may have negative effects on legitimate traffic. For instance, multipath routing, ei-
ther in the form of AS paths or intra-domain paths, would distribute attack traffic
as well, thereby widens the effects of attacks. Worse yet, route diversity could
disturb identification and throttling attempts of attack traffic at remote routers.
Accordingly, it is necessary for routers to exploit the route diversity of the Internet
exclusively for delivering legitimate traffic.
Our Contributions. In Chapter 4, we present a mutually-controlled path
diversification mechanism, where administrative domains (i.e., ASs) exploit the path
diversity of the Internet for routing legitimate traffic, while complying to the routing
policies (i.e., BGP import/export policies) of other domains. Meanwhile, suspicious
flows1 of flooding attacks are routed through a default path that is nailed down to
1We define potential but non-verifiable attack flows as suspicious flows.
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minimize their impact on other legitimate flows – attack localization. In summary,
we mitigate and localize the effects of link flooding attacks by applying “differential”
routing policies. The constituting mechanisms for achieving this goal are:
• Mutually-Controlled Multipath Routing. Path diversity in the Internet is ex-
ploited in a mutually controlled manner by the domains at network edges,
leaving the core intact: a congested router informs a source/provider domain
of its congestion and a preferred domain(s) through which packets are deliv-
ered, and the notified source/provider domain selects the best path (AS path)
that includes the designated domain. Of course, only legitimate domains (dis-
tinguished as such at the congested router) would take the advantage of path
diversity informed by the congested router, while end-hosts (potential attack
sources) have no control over path selection.
• Path Pinning. While routers reroute flows that originate from uncontami-
nated domains through less congested paths, they forward attack flows that
originate from contaminated domains through a single, default path to confine
attack effects on other legitimate flows. To this end, a congested router sends
a path pinning request for attack flows back to the upstream domains, and
the requested domains suppress route changes on those flows. Thus, attack
flows would not take advantage of multiple/alternate path routing supported
either by AS path diversity or by IGP’s best path selection process.
• Rate Throttling. Throttling the bandwidth of attack flows near their origin,
if possible, can best counter flooding attacks. To motivate source-end defense,
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the bandwidth of flooded link is differentially allocated to source domains
based on their compliance with the rate-throttling request by the congested
router – reward policy.
We design a complementary routing system equipped with the above features
under the following considerations:
• Deployment Incentive. Multipath routing enables source domains to direct
the flows that would experience severe congestion via a less congested path,
and packet marking and bandwidth control to prioritize traffic originating from
them (which otherwise would be equally treated at the congested link) based
on customer/provider relationship. Hence, both mechanisms provide positive
incentive to (source) domains that employ our scheme.
• Policy Compliance and Backward Compatibility. Our multipath routing
operates based on the (multiple) paths exposed by other domains. Thus, it
conforms to the route export policies applied at downstream domains (through
BGP). And, by exploiting path diversity in an AS level, our scheme discloses
neither intra-domain topology nor route import/export policy of a domain to
other domains.
• Little Overhead. We implement rerouting by applying import policies to
the border routers of a domain. This requires an additional control message
from a route controller to the border routers (see section 4.4.1), yet would
not cause extra overhead to control plane as well as data plane. While path
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pinning requires an extra functionality (i.e., tunneling), routers that perform
path-pinning trade off authenticity validation and tunnel-identifier overloading
in the packet (using a capability) with forwarding table lookup. This, in effect,
prevents unauthorized flows at their destination from wasting the bandwidth
of the requested domains.
1.4 Organization
The balance of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present
a scheme that provides link access guarantees for capability requests. We then
provide bandwidth guarantees to the legitimate flows by identifying and rate-limiting
attack flows in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we present a route control scheme that
mitigates the effects of flooding attacks on the legitimate traffic that originate from
uncontaminated domains. We then conclude in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Dependable Connection Setup for
Network Capabilities
2.1 Outline of the Chapter
We first explore related work in Section 2.2 and provide an overview of our scheme
in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we present a new, path identification mechanism that
provides each packet with an unforgeable domain identifier of its origin. Precise
link-access guarantees are provided to those path-identifiers by a dynamic virtual
queueing mechanism presented in Section 2.5 and those guarantees are preserved in
the face of wide dispersion of attack sources by a path aggregation mechanism pre-
sented in Section 2.6. The effectiveness of our scheme is evaluated by ns2 simulations
under different attack scenarios and by comparing the results of these simulations
with those of TVA [YWA08] in Section 2.7.
2.2 Background and Related Work
Lack of source address authenticity in the Internet Protocol (IP) enables attackers
to forge the source addresses, and hence makes address-based accounting difficult
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during link flooding attacks. As a way to add authenticity to a packet, capabil-
ity solutions [ARW03, YPS04, YWA05, YWA08] have been proposed. Generally, a
network-layer capability protocol requires a handshake between a client and a server,
and during that phase, routers on the forwarding path collectively issue a connection
capability; i.e., a series of router capabilities on the path. This capability protocol
can be described as follows.
Capability Protocol. During the connection establishment phase of a flow, a
router Rj generates a capability for that connection by hashing the packet’s source
and destination addresses (IPS , IPD) with the router’s secret (KRj); i.e., Hash(IPS ,
IPD , KRj). The router writes the capability in the client’s connection request packet
(e.g., TCP-SYN) to the server. Thus, a router issues an authenticated identifier for
a flow that can be verified only by the router itself. This capability is returned
to the client along with the server’s acknowledgement (e.g., TCP-SYN/ACK), and
is carried in the client’s subsequent packets to the server. In Figure 2.1, the flow
identifier fi at Rj is the capability Cj since Cj can only be authenticated by the Rj.
In this way, the flow authenticity is guaranteed at every router.
However, as pointed out in [AC05b], the capability request protocol is still
vulnerable to flooding (DoC) attacks. That is, flooding with capability requests,
which cannot be prioritized, successfully denies a legitimate access to a congested
link. Portcullis [PWS+07] proposes a puzzle based mechanism that provides a guar-
anteed link access during a flooding (DoC) attack. Though useful, any guarantee
that depends on the client’s computational power and the number of attack sources
could be weakened if adversaries compromise a large number of “bots” in the In-
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ternet (e.g., the size of a botnet easily exceeds 1 million bots [bot]). Alternatively,
TVA’s implementation of fair queueing on incoming traffic paths (i.e., hierarchical
fair queueing) [YWA08], which equally assigns a queue to each of directly connected
links and recursively splits the queue for distant links, places legitimate accesses of
remote domains at a significant disadvantage since it provides fair service to the
same level of queues (i.e., sub-queues split from a queue).
Attempts to block suspicious traffic upstream of a congested router by in-
stalling filters close to, or at, the domains originating attacks could protect legitimate
flows that are independent of attacks (e.g., different destination prefixes) [MBF+02].
To be effective, cooperative filtering would require incentives that scale with the
number of participating domains – a tall order since it depends on the attack it-
self. Furthermore, with only local information (the traffic rate of incoming links), a
router cannot easily identify the links (or upstream links) that are responsible for
the congestion; and even if such information is available, an adversary can launch
a timed attack where different groups of zombies/bots issue targeted requests by
exploiting the time delay required for installing and releasing filters at upstream
routers (e.g., on-off and rolling attacks).
2.3 Design Overview




The main threat we deal with in this work is the link flooding attacks on the
capability-setup channel, where attack sources collaboratively exhaust the link band-
width assigned for connection establishment. We assume that both hosts and routers
can be compromised and send/forward attack traffic. Compromised hosts flood a
target link with capability request packets and disturb the path identification mech-
anism at a remote router by manipulating the header reserved for that purpose (viz.,
Section 2.4.1). Whereas, compromised routers only disturb path identification by
either bypassing false path-markings or adding invalid path markings to the packets
they forward without actively generating attack packets.
2.3.2 Path Identification
In identifying the source domain of a packet, we use the packet’s routing path from
its origin to destination to take advantage of two features provided by it. First, a
packet’s routing path, when constructed by the routers on the packet forwarding
path like previous path identification approaches [YPS03,YWA08], can be used as
an authentic (meaning unspoofable) identifier, because it cannot be controlled by
the end-hosts1. Second, routing paths can locate packets’ origins in the Internet
by enabling a remote router to construct a traffic tree. The domain connectivity
revealed in the traffic tree helps identify the distribution of attack sources in specified
1IP source routing may allow a client to select a path to a destination. However, loose source
routing is usually blocked at routers to avoid spoofing attacks, and strict source routing cannot
be easily available at an end-host since there is no easy way to construct an exact routing path to
the destination at the end host.
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locales to which bandwidth allocation will be optimized (viz., Section 2.6).
The basic concept of route construction is similar with that of previous schemes
[YPS03,YWA08], yet we use a packet’s AS (Autonomous System) path as a domain
identifier for a couple of reasons. First, a packet’s AS path, which is primarily
determined by the number of AS hops (AS path length) to the destination in the
inter-domain routing protocol (e.g., BGP-4 [RL95]), is more stable than its full
routing path that may frequently change during flooding attacks due to link state
changes (e.g., link failure). Namely, the AS path of a packet could be used as a
persistent domain identifier. Second, a packet’s AS path can be constructed by the
egress router of the source domain that contains the AS path information of des-
tination addresses in its routing table. This source-constructible domain identifier
eliminates deployment issues that previous path-marking schemes have especially
at the Internet core, and hence enables independent adoption of the (path) mark-
ing scheme at the Internet border (e.g., provider/stub domains). We envision that
prioritizing requests originating from path-marking domains would encourage early
adoption of the marking scheme.
We define a packet’s AS path to its destination as the “path-identifier” of the
packet, and present it in the order of marking: from the origin to the destination.
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, the path-identifier seen at a congested router in
AS1 is {AS4, AS3, AS2, AS1}. We implement the path-identifier in a shim header like
capabilities. Throughout this paper, we denote the path-identifier whose marking
starts with ASi by “Si” and the BGP speaker of ASi by “Ri”. In Section 2.4, we
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Figure 2.1: Path Identifier. R′4 is the egress router of AS4 and R3, R2, R1 are the
ingress routers of AS3, AS2, AS1 respectively. RC stands for the congested router.
R′4 writes the path-identifer to the packet heading to server S in AS1, and ingress
routers on the path validate the marking. Cj is the capability issued by Rj. Each
ingress router can validate the shaded part of the marking.
2.3.3 Link Access Guarantees
In defending flooding attacks on capability-setup channel, our goal is to provide
precise guarantees of link access to the capability requests, where the guarantees
are provided in a domain basis to confine the effects of attacks within the domains
they originate. This goal is achieved by a new fair queueing mechanism, and the
guarantees provided by the queueing mechanism are optimized to favor the requests
from uncontaminated domains via a path aggregation mechanism.
2.3.3.1 Fair Queueing Revisited
The choice of a fair queueing scheme for link-access guarantees is intended to max-
imize service on the legitimate capability requests. Fair queueing schemes, if they
can assign distinct queues to path-identifiers, could provide fair bandwidth to the
path-identifiers without link under-utilization (which could occur whenever strict
bandwidth reservation is made to individual path-identifiers). However, when the
spatio-temporal dynamics of domains contributing to congestion (e.g., time-varying
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patterns of domain traffic) are considered, such queue assignment in a limited buffer
is also a challenging problem. For example, for a fixed buffer size, under-provisioning
of the number of queues in a specific time period may fail to provide link-access
guarantees on path-identifiers due to potential queue collisions among different path-
identifiers. In contrast, over-provisioning of it would decrease the size of individual
queues, hence weaken the guarantees (viz., Section 2.5). Thus, we aim to design a
fair queueing scheme that assigns a unique queue to each path-identifier and adjusts
the individual queue sizes to fit the buffer size for link-access guarantees and their
enhancement – a desired goal.
While a variety of traditional fair queueing schemes focus on the bandwidth
fairness of flows in different queues that contain various sizes of packets, the “Stochas-
tic Fair Queueing (SFQ)” scheme [Pau90] offers queue length fairness through a
“buffer stealing” mechanism, whereby a packet that finds buffer full on its arrival
would steal a buffer-slot from the longest queue. We note that the “fixed size” ca-
pability request packet would eliminate the intrinsic bandwidth unfairness of SFQ
in the presence of different packet sizes [Shr95]. Based on the buffer-stealing idea,
we improve SFQ in two respects. First, we avoid queue collisions among path-
identifiers that are allowed but fairly distributed via stochastic queue assignment in
SFQ. Second, we make queue management operations (e.g., queue assignment and
buffer-slot preemption) scalable and efficient to easily adapt our scheme to diverse
operating environments (e.g., link capacity, the number of required queues). Those
improvements are made by a dynamic virtual queueing mechanism below.
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2.3.3.2 Path Aggregation
As more domains are contaminated by attack sources, link-access guarantees pro-
vided by our queueing scheme become weak as both available link bandwidth and
buffer-slots to each path-identifier decrease. This undesirable dependency of guaran-
tees on attack dispersion is unavoidable as long as all path-identifiers are “equally”
treated. Protecting requests of uncontaminated domains essentially needs a differ-
ential treatment of path-identifiers based on the proportion of legitimate requests
they deliver. Though the legitimacy of individual capability requests cannot be val-
idated, the proportion of legitimate requests in a set of requests can be estimated by
a couple of flow conformance tests, which consist of (1) a test on “bandwidth con-
formance” that represents the aggressiveness of requests and (2) a test on “protocol
conformance” that indicates the legitimacy of authorized flows in various respects
(viz., Section 2.6.1).
Conformance tests performed on each path-identifier enables differential as-
signment of bandwidth to path-identifiers that maximizes service to legitimate re-
quests at the flooded link. Yet, in the presence of large number of attack domains,
such assignment cannot be easily made, nor it tolerate imprecise measurement of
domain contamination. Instead, we aggregate the path-identifiers of a highly con-
taminated locale and assign a new path-identifier to them. This, in effect, limits
both available bandwidth and buffer space for those path-identifiers.
Besides the technical ease in offering differential guarantees, aggregations based
on the path-identifier prefix would (1) confine the attack effects to the nearby
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domains whose traffic can possibly be policed by a single administrative author-
ity (e.g., provider/in-transit AS), and (2) make further optimizations viable, e.g.,
installing filter at the rendezvous point of the aggregated paths (e.g., pushback
[MBF+02, IB02]) or path bandwidth control for authorized flows2. We mathemat-
ically formulate this aggregation problem as a constrained optimization problem,
and provides an efficient algorithm in Section 2.6.3.
2.4 Path Identification
In this section, we start with the basic path identification mechanism, and then
enhance the mechanism with additional security features.
The basic path identification mechanism works as follows. When the egress
router of a domain (i.e., the BGP speaker) forwards a packet that originates from
its domain, it writes the path-identifier (i.e., the AS path to the destination) in
the packet’s header. AS ingress routers of the packet forwarding path can validate
the authenticity of a fraction of this path-identifier starting with the upstream AS
that forwarded the packet and ending with the destination AS as shown in Figure
2.1. Whenever AS ingress routers receive a non-marked packet, they write their
own path-markings: the AS path from their upstream AS to the destination AS.
Thus, packets that originate from a marking domain have a unique path-identifier,
yet packets from a non-marking domain could share the same path-identifier with
those from different domains.
2Aggregating flows that have heterogeneous path characteristics (e.g., delay) would deteriorate
fair bandwidth utilization among those flows or make any such effort difficult.
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As remote domains can validate only a part of path markings, attack sources in
unprotected (non-marking) domains may spoof path-identifiers unless the marking
scheme (which includes the verification function) is sufficiently deployed. Even under
wide deployment of the marking scheme, the authenticity of path-identifiers verified
at a domain cannot be delegated to the downstream domains without a strong trust
relationship established between those domains. This makes any manipulation of
path-identifiers by compromised routers undetectable at remote routers. To protect
path-identifiers from potential attacks (e.g., spoofing and replay attacks), we present
a “secure” path identification mechanism below.
2.4.1 Unspoofable path-identifier
We first introduce potential attacks that disturb path-identification at remote routers
and present our defense mechanism against those attacks.
Spoofing Attack: Let {ASn, . . . , AS2, AS1} be the path-identifier seen at the
congested router, and let ∗ and # denote any valid and forged sequence of markings
respectively.
• Spoofing by Sources: Compromised sources in unprotected domains (by our
marking scheme) can forge a path-identifier as {#, ASi, ∗, AS1} if domains up
to ASi are unprotected.
• Spoofing by Routers: Compromised routers in ASk can forge a path-identifier
as {#, ASk, ∗, AS1}, or as {#, ASi, ∗, AS1} if domains from ASk−1 to ASi is
unprotected (where k − 1 > i).
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In principle, a router can authenticate its path-markings by adding a digital
signature on the marking. However, adding a digital signature in every packet would
impose significant computational overhead for both its generation and verification.
Moreover, a per-packet signature, if employed, could be exploited by attackers to
exhaust routers’ computational resources (e.g., by flooding small size packets). In-
stead, we present an efficient path-identifier authentication mechanism (in the sense
that authentication does not require per-packet cryptographic operation), where
each domain pre-distributes its domain-authenticator and uses it to authenticate its
path-markings. One fundamental assumption for implementing this mechanism is
that any protected AS has a public-private key pair certified by a trusted certificate
authority (e.g., ICANN).
2.4.1.1 Authenticator Distribution
When a BGP speaker advertises an address prefix that belongs to its domain, the
BGP speaker adds an origin authentication number (OAN), which is unique in its
domain and is digitally signed with the domain’s private-key, to its route adver-
tisement. This can be implemented along with a secure BGP mechanism (e.g.,
sBGP [Ste00],soBGP [Rus03]) as it employs a digital signature scheme in adver-
tising routes for address and route attestation purposes. All domains that receive
this route advertisement hold the authenticated ASN(AS Number)-OAN pair of the
origin in their routing table for later path-identifier authentication.
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2.4.1.2 Origin Authentication
The BGP speaker of a packet’s domain of origin writes its ASN-OAN pair followed by
the AS path to the destination in the path-identifier header. Figure 2.2 illustrates the
cases for origin authentication under different deployment scenarios of the marking
scheme; e.g., a marking origin AS in ¬ and a non-marking origin AS in ­. Whenever
no path-identifier is present in a packet, the ingress router of a marking AS constructs
path-markings with its own ASN-OAN pair (viz., ­ in Figure 2.2). Invalid path-
markings can be identified even in the presence of consecutive non-marking ASes on
the paths and be filtered on the way to, or at the destination AS.
Meanwhile, a compromised router in ASi can forge two types of valid path-
identifiers such as {ASi,OAN ki , ∗} and {#, ASi,OAN ki , ∗}. However, their effects
can be limited to at most those of two path-identifiers by aggregating (i.e., discard-
ing) the non-authenticated prefixes of path-identifiers.
2.4.2 Preventing Replay Attacks
Under partial deployment of our path-marking scheme, attack sources in unprotected
domains may forge path-identifiers ending with authenticated ASN-OAN pairs (since
ASN-OAN pairs are not confidential to end-hosts) and use them in flooding a target
link. That is, authenticated ASN-OAN pairs can be replayed. Such “replay” attacks
would significantly affect the requests of protected domains.
Path-marking routers counter replay attacks via fast OAN renewals, which
are efficiently implemented using a reverse hash chain [PWS+07]. Let OAN0i be the
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Figure 2.2: Path-identifier Authentication. ¬ Path-identifier written at the packet’s
origin (AS4) can be validated at any domain (e.g., AS2, AS1) in the presence of a
non-marking domain(s) (e.g., AS3) on the packet’s forwarding path. ­ If the origin
AS (e.g., AS4) does not participating in the marking, the first participant on the
path (e.g., AS2) writes its marking and adds the incoming AS number (AS3) to
distinguish the packets it forwards from the ones originating from it. ® An invalid
ASN-OAN pair (e.g., OAN# represents a forged OAN at AS4) can be detected and
filtered at any participating domain.
initial OAN of ASi. ASi constructs a hash chain of OANs by repeatedly hashing





for 1 6 k 6 M), and distributes OANMi (with M) when advertising a route. We
engage ASi and k − 1 in generating OAN to produce distinct OAN sequences for
different initial OANs and ASes respectively. A BGP speaker uses OANki (with k)
for path-identifier marking during a predefined interval; and changes it to OANk−1i
in the next interval. Hence, without breaking the hash function, an attacker cannot
construct the valid sequence of OANki s to be used. A (ingress) router can authen-
ticate OANki by computing Hash(OAN
k
i ||ASi||k) and comparing it with OANk+1i .
This OAN authentication is performed only once for every OAN renewal. Once
OANki is used, OAN
k+1
i is invalidated. Note that if the OAN renewal period is
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less than the time required for replaying OANs, replay attacks will be effectively
prevented.
2.5 Dynamic Virtual Queueing
In this section, we describe a dynamic virtual queueing mechanism for link-access
guarantees on path-identifiers. Our dynamic virtual queueing mechanism is designed
to assign a separate queue to active path-identifiers and provide queue length fairness
to the path-identifiers in a min-max manner. For these purposes, a router manages
virtual queues rather than physically separate queues, that are distinguished by the
path-identifier (Si), its count at time t (NSi(t)) and packet location (memory ad-
dress) (ASi) in the buffer; i.e., (Si, NSi(t), ASi). Given those tuples and the buffer size
LQ, queue-length fairness on path-identifiers (min maxSi∈S NSi(t) for
∑
Si∈S NSi(t) =
LQ) can be described by the following buffer-slot preemption policy. If a packet finds
the buffer full on its arrival, it preempts a buffer-slot from the longest virtual queue.
If the arrived packet belongs to the longest virtual queue, or its preemption pro-
duces another longest virtual queue, it would be dropped. This preemption policy
provides min-max fairness in terms of the virtual queue length, hence ensures guar-
anteed buffer-slots to each path-identifier if the number of buffered path-identifiers
can be bounded. We assume that the number of buffered path-identifiers can be
statistically or deterministically bounded by |S|max at a router (i.e., the minimum

























Figure 2.3: Counting Bloom Filter : In CBF, m counter arrays (a1, . . . , am) are
associated with m hash functions (H1(·), . . . , Hm(·)). The counter value of S1 in ai
is referenced by ai[Hi(S1)].
2.5.1 Implementing Buffer-slot Preemption
For efficient and scalable accounting of virtual queue lengths, we use a new Count-
ing Bloom Filter (CBF) that holds the number of buffer-slots occupied by path-
identifiers and provides lookup, add and remove operation in O(1) time (a modified
version of CBF [Li 98]). CBF consists of m counter arrays of size 2b (a1, a2, . . . , am)
and m hash functions of b-bit output (H1, H2, . . . , Hm), where ai is associated with
Hi. For an input to CBF (e.g., S1), each hash function maps its output to locate the
corresponding array position as illustrated in Figure 2.3; i.e., ai[Hi(S1)] corresponds
to the input S1 for 1 6 i 6 m.
Path-identifier accounting in CBF works as follows. All array values are ini-
tialized to zero. When a packet is added to the buffer, its path-identifier is fed into
CBF. Then, CBF locates m array positions for the path-identifier, and increases the
corresponding array values. The same applies to a packet removal from the buffer,
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yet the counter values are decreased. In this scheme, the limited hash output size
(i.e., 2b) could cause hash collisions among path-identifiers (i.e., same hash output
for different path-identifiers). Such hash collisions would make corresponding array
values increased by multiple path-identifiers, hence make them corrupted. However,
unless all of the array values associated with a path-identifier Si are corrupted, we
can compute the count of buffered Si’s by taking the minimum of the array values;
i.e., min{a1[H1(Si)], a2[H2(Si)], ..., am[Hm(Si)]}. Since the probability that all m ar-
ray values of a path-identifier are corrupted is (1− (1− (1/2b))|S|)m for |S| buffered
path-identifiers [FKSS01], we can make the probability of false counting negligible
by increasing the size of arrays (2b) or the number of arrays (m).
Path-identifiers that occupy more buffer slots than the guaranteed amount
(i.e., bLQ|S| c) should be kept track of for possible preemption. To this end, a router
maintains a table, named Path-Identifier Record (PIR), that holds “over-buffered”
path-identifiers, their counts and corresponding packet locations. In PIR, path-
identifiers are stored as a form of signature (i.e., path-signature), where the “path-
signature” is defined as the concatenation of m hash outputs of a path-identifier.
This makes a buffer-slot preemption efficient because the preempted packet’s path-




If the packet arrivals of path-identifier Si are modeled as a Poisson process and
k buffer-slots are allocated to Si, the probabilistic lower bound of Si’s link access
(denoted by G(|S|, k, Si)) is provided as follows.
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(2.1)
where λSi is the request rate of Si, ρSi =
λSi |S|
CR








We justify the Poisson arrival model of capability requests with two reasons:
(1) during the “short” interval that the guarantees are defined (i.e., the maximum
queueing delay of a router ∆Q), the capability requests by different clients can be
assumed independent; and (2) a single capability can be used for multiple “corre-
lated” sessions that need to be established for most Web applications. Under this
model, for ρSi < 1, a packet carrying Si is guaranteed to be serviced if its queue




) can be guaranteed to be serviced. We provide the proof of Eq. (2.1) in
Section 2.8.1. The probabilistic guarantee of Si’s link-access is obtained by setting
|S| = |S|max and k = b LQ|S|max c.
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2.5.3 Resource Requirements
2.5.3.1 Request Packet Buffer
A large buffer (LQ) for capability request packets is preferable since it would not
only improve the guarantees (viz., Eq. (2.1)) but also handle the requests from
spontaneously created, short-lived paths. However, the size of buffer should be
bounded by the maximum allowed queueing delay to avoid unnecessary retries that
occur when sources timeout. For example, if we assume 0.25 second maximum
queueing delay and 120B3 request packet size, a router would require 1.6 MB buffer
for 1Gbs link (when 5% of link bandwidth is assigned for capability requests); and
such buffer size can provide 8 guaranteed buffer slots up to 1.67K path-identifiers.
2.5.3.2 Path-Identifier Accounting
The memory requirement for CBF is determined by a target false-positive ratio. The















since LQ = k · |S|. Hence, for a desired false positive ratio, the size
of each counter array in CBF, which is same as the size of hash output (2b), is linear
with buffer size (i.e., Θ(LQ)). For example, 1.67K path-identifier accounting with 8
hash functions would produce a reasonably low false positive ratio (1.58× 10−13%)
and require 8 × 2B (hash outputs) ×28 (counter) = 4KB for a CBF.
PIR holds the path-identifiers whose count exceeds bLQ|S| c for possible preemp-
tion. Hence, the memory requirement is bounded by LQ/(k + 1)× (32B (path-
3We reserve 80B shim header: 40B for path-identifier (up to 10 AS markings) and 40B for 5
capabilities.
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signature) + 4B (address pointer)) (e.g., 53.4KB for the above example), since the
number of path-signatures in PIR has its maximum when all path-identifiers have
k + 1 packets in the buffer. Consequently, the memory requirement for both CBF
and PIR is Θ(LQ).
2.6 Path Aggregation
In this section, we first describe a mechanism for estimating the proportion of legiti-
mate requests of individual path-identifiers, and then, an path-identifier aggregation
mechanism that maximizes the “goodput ratio”, defined as the proportion of legit-
imate requests out of all “serviced” requests, at a congested link. As mentioned
above (viz., Section 2.3.3), aggregating path-identifiers, in effect, produces an opti-
mal traffic tree to which applying our queueing mechanism maximizes goodput ratio
at the congested link.
2.6.1 Goodput Estimation
In absence of any other useful information regarding the origin of attack sources and
the path-identifiers assigned to them, the request rate of path-identifier Si (λSi) can
be used as a unique measure for estimating the goodput ratio of Si. We define the
“bandwidth conformance” of path-identifier Si as min{1, CRλSi |S|max} to represent how
the request rate of Si conforms to the assigned bandwidth to it, and denote it by
EBRi , i.e., EBRi = min{1, CRλSi |S|max} (recall that Si is assigned to all packets originating
from (or forwarded by) Ri).
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Additionally, we estimate domain contamination more accurately by identi-
fying the following attack flows: unauthorized flows, high-rate flows, and flows of
high-fanout sources.
Unauthorized flows: A capability issued by a router during the connection
establishment phase of a flow must be used at least once for actual data transmis-
sion unless it is denied afterward by application-layer services, firewalls or IDSs.
Thus, the proportion of unused capabilities could effectively measure domain con-
tamination much link previous schemes [MPR02,GP01], as it reflects the strong flow
authorization results applied at the network ends.
High-rate flows: Flows that send high-rate traffic using valid capabilities would
also exhibit high packet-drop rates as indicated in [MFW01]. Hence, if a router
implements per-domain bandwidth control4, high-rate attack flows within a domain
can be identified by capability drop rates.
High-fanout sources: If sources are allowed to establish an unlimited num-
ber of connections with other destinations through the congested link, they can
deplete link’s bandwidth with a large number of “legitimate-looking” flows [SP09].
This insidious attack will be prevented if a router issues only a limited number of
capabilities to a single source as follows.
Let Cfs,d be the capability for a flow fs,d between a source s and a destination
d. Cfs,d consists of two parts, namely Cfs,d = C
0
fs,d
||C1fs,d . Here, Ckfs,d for k ∈ {0,1}
4Flows in different domains could exhibit different drops rates due to different RTTs.
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is defined as:
C0fs,d = Hash(IPs, IPd, K
1
R)
C1fs,d = Hash(IPs, f(IPd), K
2
R)





router’s secret keys, and f(·) is a function whose output is randomly uniform on [0,
nmax-1] (e.g., a universal hash function [CW77]).
C0fs,d provides identifier authenticity to flows like previous schemes [YPS04,
YWA08], and C1fs,d restricts the number of per-source capabilities to nmax by tak-
ing f(IPd) as a hash input. If C
1
fs,d
is used for estimating flow bandwidth, flows
originating from high-fanout sources would be identified as high-rate flows.
The above attack-flow identification measures help estimate the proportion of
“legitimate” flows in flows carrying Si, which we define the “protocol conformance”
of a path-identifier Si and denote by EPRi .
Based on the bandwidth and protocol conformances, the “conformance esti-
mate” ERi of Si, representing the estimate of Si’s goodput ratio, is defined as:
ERi = e−
γ·λSi |S|max
CR (EBRi − EPRi) + EPRi (2.2)
ERi(tj) = (1− α)ERi + αERi(tj−1) (2.3)
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where γ and α are the weighting coefficients.
The conformance estimate of Si is the weighted average of the bandwidth con-
formance and the protocol conformance, where the weighting factor exponentially
favors the protocol conformance as sufficient requests have been made5. We deter-
mine ERi at time tj by taking the moving average of ERis, and update it once in
every aggregation period (∆agg
6); i.e., tj − tj−1 = ∆agg.
2.6.2 Aggregation Problem
Based on the conformance estimates of path-identifiers, a router performs path
aggregation to maximize goodput at the flooded link. To this end, the congested
router R0 builds the traffic tree (TR0) using the path identifiers carried in the “active”
flows and decomposes it as a combination of legitimate tree (T LR0) and attack tree
(T AR0). T LR0 is constructed by removing the leaf nodes whose conformance estimate
is less than a certain threshold (Eth) from TR0 ; and T AR0 is constructed by removing
the leaf nodes present in T LR0 from TR0 . Then, the congested router constructs a new
traffic tree T ′R0 by merging those two trees at the root (i.e., disjoint union of T LR0
and T AR0), and performs aggregation on T ′R0 . Thus, legitimate paths would never be
aggregated with attack paths.
The congested router starts path aggregation from neighboring domains (i.e.,
domains with longest suffix-matching path-identifiers) to localize attack effects; and
proceeds aggregation until a desired number of path reductions are made (viz., Eq.
5An insufficient number of requests from a domain could significantly bias the domain’s protocol
conformance; e.g., unexpected packet drops experienced by a low-rate path-identifier would result
in a very low protocol conformance.
6∆agg is set to a multiple of RTT (e.g., 20·RTT in our simulations).
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(2.4)). This aggregation is performed with respect to the conformance estimates of
paths as guarantees of link-access should not be biased by the request rates of paths.
Hence, if the number of path identifiers is bounded by |S|max, the path aggregation
problem is to construct an optimal tree which has |S|max distinct paths and to
which providing link-access guarantees maximizes goodput ratio at the congested
link. This can be defined as a constrained optimization problem below.
Let R be the set of all nodes in T ′R0 , and Ri be the set of leaf nodes of a
subtree rooted at Ri ∈ T ′R0 (i.e., TRi). And, let SL and SA be the set of legitimate
and attack path-identifiers respectively. Then, the optimization problem is defined
as:















where IRi is the indicator function which equals 1, if paths are aggregated at Ri, and
0, otherwise. For a non-aggregated path, IRi is 1 at the leaf node. Since
∑
Si∈S IRi
is the number of path identifiers seen at R0, it should be bounded by |S|max.
In the above equation, aggregation at Ri decreases the total conformance esti-
mate (i.e., O(T ′R0)) by |Ri|−1|Ri|
∑
Rj∈Ri ERj , which we define as the “aggregation cost”
and denote by CA(Ri). Since a set of nodes at which aggregating path-identifiers has
the minimum (total) aggregation cost, would be a solution to the above problem,
the above optimization problem can be recast as:
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where k = |S| − |S|max.
As one can see, if the set of aggregation points (routers) are fixed, the optimiza-
tion problem of Eq. (2.5) is exactly same as the 0-1 knapsack problem (CA(Ri)/|Ri|
can be considered as the unit value of an element, Ri as the size of an element,
and k as the knapsack size.) which is known to be NP-complete. In Eq. (2.5), the
set of aggregation points and the relative aggregation cost (i.e., the unit value) of a
leaf node ( |Ri|−1|Ri| ERj , Rj ∈ Ri) vary as aggregation proceeds to the root. Hence, the
0-1 knapsack problem should be repeatedly solved as the set of aggregation points
is redefined. This means that finding an optimal solution of this problem is at least
as difficult as finding that of the 0-1 knapsack problem. We present an efficient
algorithm for this problem below.
2.6.3 Aggregation Algorithm
Whenever aggregation is necessary (i.e., |S| > |S|max), aggregation is performed
as summarized in Algorithm 1 below. Let O be the solution set whose elements
are the nodes at which we perform aggregation, and C be the candidate set whose
elements consist of all nodes that could be a solution. Initially, O is empty and C has
all intermediate (i.e., non-leaf) nodes in T ′R0 as its elements. Then, the algorithm
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works as follows. First, the node having the lowest aggregation cost in C is added to
O. Second, a node Ri ∈ C replaces the current solution set if its aggregation cost is
less than the total aggregation cost of the nodes in O. Whenever a node is added to
O, all its descendants are excluded from both the solution and the candidate set (to
avoid the case that a single path is aggregated multiple times). They are returned
to C when their parent node is replaced by another node. This procedure continues
until the last added node to the solution set satisfies the constraint on the number
of path identifiers in Eq. (2.5).
Algorithm 1 Aggregation
1: Set O = ∅ and C = {Ri|Ri ∈ T ′R0 −R0}.
2: Move the lowest aggregation cost node in C to O.






• CA(Ri) > maxRj∈O CA(Rj)
4: Repeat steps 2 and 3 until the minimum number of required path-identifier
reductions (Eq. (2.5)) is satisfied.
The example in Fig. 2.4 illustrates this algorithm. The parenthesized number
in the table represents the number of path-identifier reduced at each step. Starting
from R1, when R4 is added to O, the total aggregation cost of O exceeds that of
R2. Hence, R2 replaces all others in O. In the same way, when R5 is reached
(after 5th line in the table), R3 replaces all others in O. All the descendants of the
aggregated node are excluded from both the solution and the candidate set, and
they are returned to C when their parent is de-aggregated.















































Figure 2.4: Aggregation example. The numbers in the leaf and intermediate nodes
represent the conformance estimates and the aggregation costs respectively. And,

















Figure 2.5: Topology used in simulation.
Legend: “d” is the number of sibling nodes (degree) and “h” is the tree height.
minimum cost decreases in the candidate set, and this helps bound its distance of
its solution from the optimal by the product of Eth and the degree of the last added
node. We provide the proof of this error bound in Section 2.8.2.
2.7 Simulation Results
In this section, we present our ns2 simulation results for various attack scenarios to




























Figure 2.6: Request drop ratio of legit-

























Figure 2.7: Request service probability
of legitimate paths with respect to band-
width utilization (ρ). The solid horizontal
lines inside bars represent the probabilis-
tic guarantees (G(|S|, k, Si)).
worst case effect of different attacks and to ascertain how well our design goals are
satisfied. The balanced tree shown in Figure 2.5 is used for simulations that evaluate
the access guarantees and the effectiveness of aggregation. The unbalanced tree is
used to show that our scheme effectively provides access guarantees to domains
independently of their location on a routing path. We assign 5% of link capacity to
the capability request channel as in [YWA08]. In most simulations, the total request
rate of legitimate sources is set close to the link capacity of request channel (i.e.,
ρSi ≈ 1 for legitimate domains) to accurately capture the effects of attacks. Requests
are randomly placed during the specified simulation interval to approximate Poisson
arrivals.
We compare our simulation results with those of TVA [YWA08], which also
implements a request-packet accounting scheme for the capability setup channel
using a hierarchical fair-queueing algorithm.
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2.7.1 Link-Access Guarantees
To evaluate the local effect of flooding attacks in our scheme, we use a 27-path
balanced tree, where 30 legitimate sources are attached to each leaf node, and attack
sources are increased at a leaf node. In this simulation, we set the number of access-
guaranteed paths (|S|max) to 27 and the buffer size to that of 108 packets so that 4
buffer-slots are guaranteed to each path. Each source randomly starts 100 different
sessions (which is equivalent to 100 times more sources) between 0 and 10 seconds.
This source configuration is used for entire simulations. We also run simulations
with a TVA [YWA08] router configured to have 1000 queues of length 4 (as TVA
requires distinct queues for individual sources in the current implementation) for
comparative evaluation.
As Figure 2.6 shows, the request drop ratios of legitimate paths are stable over
the wide range of attack strengths with both our scheme and TVA. That is, both
schemes effectively localize flooding attacks when compared with the “no defense”
case. Note that a per-client defense would have the same result as that of “no
defense” when “bots” (i.e., different machines) are used to flood the link. Yet, our
scheme outperforms TVA with a much smaller buffer (108 vs. 4000 buffer-slots).
This is because our scheme dynamically adjusts virtual-queue lengths in a min-
max manner, which in effect allows more than the guaranteed buffer-slots to path-
identifiers unless their bursts are synchronized (in which case, only the guaranteed
buffer-slots hold).
To illustrate the robustness of the guarantees that our scheme provides, we
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configure an extreme adversarial scenario where 60 paths of a 64-path balanced tree
(i.e., h = 3 and d = 4 in Figure 2.5) send a large number of requests, and observe the
service ratio of the remaining 4 paths. Figure 2.7 shows the probabilistic guarantee
(G(|S|, k, Si), viz., Eq. (2.1)), the stationary service probability (P (|S|, k, Si))7,
and the simulation result (Pr(|S|, k,SL)) under specified bandwidth utilizations –
the ratio of request rate to an assigned capacity. Even under this extreme attack
scenario, the service ratio of legitimate paths is close to the theoretical stationary
packet service probability, which is much higher than the probabilistic guarantees,
as illustrated in the figure.
Next, we show that link-access guarantees provided by our scheme are indepen-
dent of attack location. For this simulation, we use a 40-path unbalanced tree (i.e., h
= 9) as shown in Figure 2.5. We attach 30 legitimate sources to each leaf node, and
200 attack sources to each of eight attack nodes; four of these nodes are at different
locations for each simulation and remaining four nodes are placed farthest from the
flooded link. In this scenario, we simulate the queue implementation for G(34, 8, Si),
G(64, 4, Si), and G(64, 8, Si) and those for the corresponding 4 and 8-slot queues in
a TVA router (i.e., 4000 and 8000 total buffer-slots respectively). Figure 2.8 shows
the request drop ratios of legitimate paths, where the horizontal axis represents the
index of attack location assigned in an ascending order of distance from the attack
target (viz., unbalanced tree in Figure 2.5). With our scheme, the request drop
ratios are uniform over different attack locations. This means our scheme provides
7For k guaranteed buffer-slots, the stationary packet service probability of Si is determined





. This is derived from the blocking probability of a M/M/1/k
queueing system.
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almost same protection against flooding attacks independently of the attackers’ lo-
cation. In contrast, TVA’s performance is highly dependent upon attackers’ location
because TVA assigns queues to each of the directly connected links equally, splits
those queues into sub-queues for distant links recursively (i.e., makes queue assign-
ment based on a router’s confidence on traffic origin), and provides fair service to
the sub-queues split from a queue.
2.7.2 Aggregation Effect
Path-identifier aggregation, which optimizes domain bandwidth allocation when at-
tack sources are widely dispersed across domains, occurs whenever the number of
active paths (|S|) becomes greater than the number of access-guaranteed paths
(|S|max). In Figure 2.8, the result of the queue implementation for G(34, 8, Si)
illustrates the effectiveness of aggregation. As aggregation increases bandwidth al-
location to legitimate paths by a factor of |S|−|S|max|S|max (i.e., 6/34 ≈ 17.6% in that
simulation), the request drop ratio of those paths decreases 76.8% (from 6.43% to
1.49%) when compared with that of the queue implementation for G(64, 4, Si) (under
which no path aggregation occurs). This is far below the stationary drop probability
of legitimate paths (i.e., 1−P (|S|, 8, Si) ≈ 5.32%) that would result when physically
separate queues are assigned to individual paths.
We also evaluate the effectiveness of the protocol conformance measure in
aggregating attack paths. For this, we configure a 64-path balanced tree such that








































Figure 2.8: Request drop ratio of legiti-
mate paths with respect to attack location
in the unbalanced tree. TVA(k) repre-


























% Attack Sources in Contaminated Domains
Figure 2.9: Aggregation by protocol con-
formance: The request service ratio of le-
gitimate paths increases as the fraction of
bots becomes higher.
all paths identical. Then, we set |S|max to 34 (which limits the number of attack
path-identifiers by at most two) and increase the fraction of attack sources whose
capability requests are denied at the destination host from 10 to 100% in half of leaf
nodes (i.e., 32 nodes). Note that the bandwidth conformance measure alone cannot
distinguish attack paths from legitimate ones when the same request rates occur in
all paths.
As Figure 2.9 shows, aggregation is more precisely performed on attack paths
(which leads to higher service ratios of legitimate paths) as the fraction of attack
sources in contaminated domains grows. When domains are lightly contaminated,
legitimate paths can be aggregated because the cost of multi-level aggregation (i.e.,
aggregation at a distant node from leaf nodes) of those attack paths is higher than
that of legitimate path aggregation. The high variation of service ratios for the
cases that the fraction of attack sources is less than 40% is also caused by imprecise

















Figure 2.10: Time variation of goodput ratio at the congested link.
Legend: Error bars represent the minimum and maximum of goodput ratio.
level aggregation).
2.7.3 Rolling Attacks
Another simulation we performed is that for the “rolling attacks”, whereby attack
sources change their location to exploit delays in the response time of any defense
mechanism. For this simulation, we attach 16 attack nodes at 4 different locations
in the unbalanced tree (i.e., at node 1,2,9 and 10) of Figure 2.5 and place 200 attack
sources in each attack node. We configure a rolling attack such that attack sources
attached to node 1 and 10 flood the target for 10 seconds and the other attack
sources for the next 10 seconds with a 20-second period.
In Figure 2.10, we illustrate the time variation of goodput ratio (viz., Section
2.6) at the congested link averaged over 10 runs. The goodput ratio is very low
at the beginning of the simulation, since attack requests go through the target
link before being preempted by legitimate ones. However, as buffer-preemption
occurs (i.e., as soon as the buffer is filled) and aggregation starts (around t =
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2), the goodput ratio rises sharply. Changing attack location in every 10 seconds
significantly decreases the goodput ratio as the number of attack path-identifiers
seen at the congested router increases four times (i.e., from 2 aggregated path-
identifiers to 8 path-identifiers). However, these effects disappear whenever a new
aggregation decision is made on the switched attack paths in ∆agg (which is 20·RTT
≈ 2 seconds in this simulation).
2.8 Proof of Claims
2.8.1 Proof of Guarantees
If ρSi 6 1, a packet carrying Si is guaranteed to be serviced if less than k arrivals of
Si have occurred in ∆Q before its arrival. Hence, the probability of service guarantee
on Si is given as follows.

















of requests must be dropped regardless of the buffer size. In this case,
only a fraction of its requests can be guaranteed to be serviced (i.e., 1
ρSi
), hence




the probability that the allocated bandwidth is fully utilized. Let Pf (Si) be the
probability that a packet arrival of Si finds k buffered Sis. The probability of full


















































Hence, the Eq. (2.6) follows.
2.8.2 Proof of Error Bound
We first define two types of aggregating node. In T ′R0 , the node whose all children
nodes are leaf nodes is defined as the “leaf aggregator” and the any other non-leaf
node is defined as “intermediate aggregator.” The last added node to the solution
set can be either a leaf aggregator or an intermediate aggregator.
If the last added node Ri to the optimal set (O) is a leaf aggregator, the error
from the optimal solution is bounded by
∑
Rj∈Ri ERj 6 |Ri| · Eth, where |Ri| is the
number of incoming links of Ri.
If the last added node to O is an intermediate aggregator, we can consider two
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different cases. Let Ri be an intermediate aggregator, and Ri1, . . . , Rin be the one-











The above inequality means that the last node added to O is either (a) the
node whose all immediate children aggregators are already aggregated, or (b) the
















6 n · Eth
Like the leaf aggregator, if aggregation is performed at an intermediate ag-
gregator Ri, the sum of aggregation costs of Ri’s children are deducted from the
total cost. Therefore, the maximum increase of aggregation cost at an intermediate
aggregator is bounded by n.
case (b):
By (2.6), a node cannot be aggregated before all of children nodes are aggre-
gated except the case that CA(Ri) <
∑
Roi∈O C
A(Roi), whereO = {Ro1, Ro2, . . . Ron}
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Hence, the increase of aggregation cost cannot be greater than the product of
Eth and the incoming-link degree of the last added node to the solution set.
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Chapter 3
FLoc : Dependable Link Access for
Legitimate Traffic in Flooding Attacks
3.1 Outline of the Chapter
In Section 3.2, we give an overview of previous flooding-attack defense mechanisms
and discuss their weakness. Then, we present an overview of our scheme called
“FLoc” in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we present an analytical model for dependable
link access: we first describe an aggregate-flow model, and based on which, we design
a scheme that provides bandwidth guarantees to aggregate-flows, identifies various
types of attacks, and limits the bandwidth of the attack flows by employing prefer-
ential drop and aggregation policies. Router implementation of FLoc is presented
in Section 3.5. FLoc’s effectiveness is evaluated both by simulating different attack
scenarios (e.g., Constant Bit Rate (CBR) attack and Shrew [KK03]) and by com-
paring the FLoc results with those of other approaches (e.g., Pushback [MBF+02]
and RED-PD [MFW01]) in the last section.
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3.2 Related Work
Recent approaches to network-layer defenses against flooding attacks intend to pro-
vide authenticated identifiers to packet flows as a means of making these flows
accountable. Network-layer capabilities, which were initially proposed in [ARW03]
and extended in [YPS04,YWA05], help prevent address spoofing and filter out un-
wanted traffic at packet destinations. Another direction is to design an accountable
Internet Protocol (e.g., AIP [ABF+08]). However, in the absence of appropriate flow
control at a congested router, network links remain vulnerable to flooding attacks
launched by “bot networks” using valid addresses.
Most flooding-attack defenses first identify the flows (or flow aggregates) caus-
ing link congestion and then limit their bandwidth. Traditional per-flow defense
mechansims [SSZ98, MFW01, FKSS01, PPP00] can be used in a capability-based
scheme to provide legitimate flows with different types of fair bandwidth sharing.
However, fair bandwidth sharing does not necessarily imply, nor is it intended to
have, the ability to distinguish between legitimate and attack flows, which is a nec-
essary requirement for achieving FLoc’s goals. For example, mechanisms that use
a single packet-drop rate [MFW01], or router-queue occupancy [FKSS01, PPP00]
cannot make this distinction. Using a single packet-drop rate will not work because
flows, legitimate or not, can have different RTT delays and hence different drop rates
(viz., Section 3.4.1, Eq. (3.1), where the packet drop rate is 1/(niTSi)) despite fair
bandwidth allocation. Using router-queue occupancy will not work either, because
both individual flows of attack aggregates and legitimate flows may have the same
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router-queue occupancy for some time periods.
Neither the ability to distinguish effectively between legitimate and attack
packet flows, which is necessary to identify a broad range of flooding attacks [XG05],
nor fair bandwidth allocation is sufficient to confine the effects of “covert” adversary
attacks (viz., Sections 3.4.2.3 and 3.6.5 for a specific example). That is, an adversary
can coordinate a large number of “bots” in one contaminated domain, or more,
and send only legitimate-looking (e.g., TCP-conformant, low-rate) flows through a
targeted link, concurrently. This can easily deplete the bandwidth allocated (fairly)
to flows of uncontaminated domains at that link [XG06, SP09]. Hence, additional
mechanisms are necessary to confine the nocive effects of such attacks.
Aggregate-based countermeasures [MBF+02,IB02,CLSS08] mitigate the down-
side of per-flow defense, yet their effectiveness is highly dependent upon how flow
aggregates are defined (e.g., in terms of “locales”) and how bandwidth is allocated
to these aggregates. Previous approaches, such as Pushback, which install filters
at remote routers, do not identify attack flow aggregates precisely since their ag-
gregates account only for the local flow rates of incoming links to a router. Also,
they lack effective mechanisms to limit “collateral damage” within attack aggregates
and do not provide incentives to domains to perform flow filtering. Furthermore,
installing filters at remote routers can be susceptible to timed attacks, whereby a
“bot network” changes attack strength (e.g., on-off attacks) or location (e.g., rolling
attacks) in a coordinated manner to avoid detection [XG05].
CDF-PSP [CLSS08] isolates the bandwidth of “high priority” flow aggregates,
which conform to historical traffic data, from that of non-conformant “low-priority”
52
traffic, and limits collateral damage by allocating bandwidth proportionally to all
high priority traffic first. However, CDF-PSP does not (aim to) provide bandwidth
guarantees. For example, some legitimate flows that exhibit uncharacteristically
high rates over a historically low-rate path receive low bandwidth allocations and,
conversely, attack flows over a historically high-bandwidth path receive high band-
width allocations. Furthermore, bandwidth isolation assumes static routing and




FLoc uses the path identifier as a domain identifier (Si) and the capability as a
flow identifier (fi). However, it does not require universal deployment since these
identifiers are located outside the IP headers and only FLoc enabled routers interpret
them.
3.3.2 Bandwidth Guarantees in Normal Mode
In normal mode of router operation, namely when a flooding attack is not in progress,
a router assigns equal link bandwidth to all outstanding path identifiers (i.e., do-
mains). Whenever congestion is detected, the service rate for each path identifier
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is set by a separate token-bucket mechanism [Par92].1 In principle, implementing
separate token buckets for individual path identifiers could provide bandwidth guar-
antees to those identifiers. In practice, however, the effective bandwidth received by
the aggregate flows of a specific identifier becomes highly dependent on the token-
bucket parameters (i.e., on the token generation period, which determines the size
of the transmission token generated at a time, and the bucket size) which are de-
termined by the number of flows and the average RTT of the path identifier. The
determination of the token bucket parameters per path identifier and that of the
RTT in practice are presented in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.1 below.
Our token-bucket mechanism is designed to guarantee the bandwidth of per-
sistent (long) TCP flows (e.g., FTP flows), which in effect guarantees bandwidth of
short TCP flows (e.g., HTTP flows) as well. This is because short TCP flows would
not experience as many consecutive packet drops (which cause congestion collapse)
as those of long TCP flows, hence they are affected by flooding attacks to a lesser
extent [KK03]. Additionally, our token-bucket mechanism offers features of active
queue management for a path-identifier’s TCP flows; e.g., early congestion notifica-
tion, TCP flow de-synchronization, and fair bandwidth allocation among these flows
(viz., Section 3.5).
1The basic idea of a token bucket mechanism is that link-access tokens are generated at a
constant rate and are buffered in a bucket that has a limited capacity. The token generation rate
determines the guaranteed bandwidth and the bucket size specifies the maximum tolerable burst
size.
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3.3.3 Bandwidth Guarantees in Attack Mode
While the normal-mode, per-domain bandwidth allocation helps localize the effects
of link congestion within the domains where flows originate, such localization is
insufficient to counter deliberate attacks for at least two reasons. First, an attack
coordinated by multiple domains reduces the bandwidth available to packet flows of
legitimate domains at a targeted link. Second, the bandwidth allocated to packet
flows originating from legitimate clients of highly contaminated domains is severely
reduced. To handle these nocive side effects, we identify attack flows and restrict
their bandwidth.
Attack-Flow Identification. We identify attack (i.e., aggressive) flows
with two related mechanisms. First, we identify domains that originate attack
flows. Our token-bucket mechanism allocates router bandwidth to individual do-
mains and makes the necessary packet drops for a desired bandwidth utilization. As
our token-bucket mechanism provides the reference drop rate for the flow aggregate
of a legitimate domain, an excessive packet-drop rate signals the presence of attack
or non-conformant flows within that domain.
Second, we identify attack flows independent of the flooding-attack strategies.
To do this, we use a flow’s average packet-drop interval, defined as the “mean time
to drop (MTD)” of the flow. In Section 3.4.2, we show that in FLoc, the MTDs of
attack flows are distinct from those of legitimate flows, and represent the strength of
attack precisely, no matter what attack strategies are employed by a “bot network”.
In Section 3.5.1 we show that the MTD-based attack identification can be efficiently
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implemented in a router since only the states of dropped packets need to be recorded
and the lifetime of those states can be precisely bounded.
Differential Bandwidth Guarantees. Once identified, attack flows are
penalized by two rate-control policies, namely preferential drop and path aggre-
gation. These policies are designed to achieve two types of differential bandwidth
guarantees: (1) packet flows of domains that are not contaminated by “bot net-
works” receive better bandwidth guarantees than flows of contaminated domains;
and equally importantly, (2) within a contaminated domain, legitimate packet flows
experience fewer packet drops, hence better throughput, than attack flows.
First, within a contaminated domain, the packets of the attack flows are pref-
erentially dropped with the aim to upper bound their throughput by their fair band-
width allocation. Accordingly, attack flows that do not respond to per-domain, fair-
bandwidth controls are penalized by increasingly more packet drops. Any misiden-
tification of legitimate flows as attack would never result in service denial once the
sources of misidentified flows respond to the packet drops by decreasing their send
rate. Hence, “collateral damage” (i.e., denied service) to legitimate flows within
attack domains is avoided.
Second, the path identifiers of highly contaminated domains are aggregated
into a single path identifier. Since router bandwidth is assigned fairly to path
identifiers, aggregation, in effect, reassigns the bandwidth of highly contaminated
domains to legitimate (i.e., non-contaminated or lightly contaminated) ones. Hence,
path aggregation helps provide higher bandwidth guarantees to legitimate (i.e., non-


































































































Figure 3.1: TCP window variations and their aggregate effect at a congested router
for unsynchronized, partially synchronized, and synchronized flows.
Legend: Upper graphs: gray areas denote individual packet-flow rates. Lower
graphs: grey areas illustrate three different distributions of the same aggregate-flow
rate at a congested router.
when attack sources (e.g., bots nets) are widely dispersed across multiple domains.
Aggregation is triggered whenever the number of outstanding path identifiers ex-
ceeds a limit set so that all active path identifiers receive a minimum guaranteed
bandwidth at a congested router.
3.4 Modeling Dependable Link Access
In this section we present an analytical model for the bandwidth guarantees for
legitimate packet flows, which define FLoc’s notion of dependable link access in
flooding attacks.
3.4.1 Token-Bucket Model Revisited
In this subsection, we first review the standard TCP congestion-control mechanism
and the aggregate traffic characteristics of multiple TCP flows at a congested router.
Then, we define the parameters of a token bucket mechanism for a (per-domain)
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path identifier that provide guaranteed bandwidth to legitimate flows in normal
(non-attack) mode of router operation.
TCP Flow Model. Let Wi be the congestion window size at the source
of TCP flow fi. The TCP congestion-avoidance protocol increases the Wfi of the
TCP source on every acknowledgement from the destination. That is, the source
increments its Wfi by one in every round trip time (RTT) until it experiences a
packet drop. After the packet drop, the source halves its Wfi , and repeats the
congestion-avoidance protocol. Figure 3.1 illustrates TCP window size variation
for n flows. Window size Wfi is typically modeled as a random variable whose
distribution is uniform on [W
2
, W ], where W is the peak congestion window size of a
flow fi’s source, as discussed in [AKM04]. In this ideal model, a source experiences
a packet drop in every W/2×RTT seconds; i.e., the “mean time to drop” for flow fi
(denoted as MTD(fi)) is MTD(fi) = W/2×RTT . Hence, for n TCP flows through
a congested router, n packet drops occur during W/2 × RTT seconds if all flows
share an equal bandwidth and have the same RTT.
Guaranteed Bandwidth for Legitimate Flows. To control the packet
drops of TCP flows on a per-domain basis, we allocate a separate token buffer to each
path identifier and customize the token generation period and bucket size for a given
bandwidth guarantee. We consider three cases of TCP flow synchronization that
affect traffic burstiness and hence the token bucket parameters; i.e., unsynchronized,
synchronized, and partially synchronized traffic.
Let us consider the ideal (best) case, namely when the flows are completely
unsynchronized; i.e., the peak window size of each source is uniformly distributed
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in time, as shown in the upper graph of Figure 3.1 in the “Unsynchronized” case.
Uniform distribution of individual sources’ peak window sizes makes their aggre-
gate token-request rate at the congested router uniform over time, leading to full
consumption of tokens; i.e., to full bandwidth utilization. This is illustrated in the
lower graph of Figure 3.1 in the “Unsynchronized” case. Let CSi be the bandwidth
guaranteed to a ni-flow path identifier Si, RTTi the average RTT of the flows in Si,
and Wi the maximum window size of the flows in Si. And, let NSi be the bucket
size measured in tokens, and TSi the token generation period. To make a packet





seconds, the bucket size is set to
NSi = CSi × Wi/2×RTTini tokens, and the bucket is filled within TSi seconds. That is,
NSi tokens are generated at the start of each period, and the unused tokens of the
previous period are removed. In this case, aggregate flows of a (per-domain) path
identifier would run out of tokens only if their token requests exceed NSi in a period
TSi . (Note that bursty requests are allowed within a period TSi .)
Now we can relate the window size of a flow’s source with that flow’s assigned
bandwidth and RTTi. The uniform distribution of the window size on the interval
[Wi
2
, Wi] implies that the average window size is
3
4
Wi. Since the bandwidth CSi
guaranteed to path identifier Si is allocated fairly (i.e., divided equally) among the
ni flows of Si, each flow’s bandwidth is CSi/ni. Thus the relationship between
a flow’s bandwidth and its window size, bwfi =
Wfi
RTT




Consequently, the token bucket parameters (i.e., token generation period and the




















In contrast, in the worst case, namely when all flows are completely synchro-
nized, they would experience packet drops in the same period TSi ; viz., the interval
denoted by [t3, t4] in upper graph of Figure 3.1 in the “Synchronized” case. In this
case, the peak token-request rate of aggregate flows at the congested router, that is
when the window size of every flow reaches at Wi, would be the twice of its minimum
that occurs when every flow halves its window size after experiencing a packet drop.
Only 3/4 of the tokens generated could be consumed in this case; e.g., the shaded
area of the lower graph of Figure 3.1 in the “Synchronized” case represents only
3/4 of the token generated in the interval [t0, t4]. Hence, the ideal token-bucket size
needs to be increased by 1/3 to accommodate the peak flows in the worst case; i.e.,
it should be increased to 4
3
NSi .
In normal (non-attack) mode of operation, flow sources are independent (e.g.,
flows are not synchronized by adversaries) and they share a token-bucket’s band-
width fairly (i.e., equally). This implies that the window size Wfi of a flow fi’s
source can be modeled as an i.i.d. random variable whose distribution is uniform on
[Wi
2
, Wi] (i.e., µWfi =
3
4





). Thus, the token-request rate of a ni
TCP-flow aggregate (i.e.,
∑ni
i=1 Wfi) has a gaussian distribution with mean niµWfi
and standard deviation
√
niσWfi (by the Central Limit Theorem). Intuitively, this
can be interpreted to mean that (1) only
√




subaggregate flows exist on a path. This is illustrated in the “Partially Synchro-
nized” case of Figure 3.1. As the lower graph of this figure illustrates, partially
synchronized flows do not consume all tokens of their bucket either, yet they utilize
the tokens (i.e., the allocated bandwidth) better than the completely synchronized
flows. This is the case because the request rates of partially synchronized flows fluc-
tuate less than that of completely synchronized flows. This suggests that the token
bucket size should be increased as a function of the flow-synchronization degree,
which determines the standard deviation of a path identifier’s token-request rate.2
Thus, expected traffic bursts are tolerated.




where µSi and σSi are the mean and standard deviation of the token request rate of








. We set the increase factor to ε =
√
123 as this would bound the peak token
requests with probability 99.97%; i.e., Pr(
∑ni
i=1 Wfi 6 µSi +
√
12σSi) = 0.9997.
Accordingly, the new, increased token-bucket size for i.i.d. flows becomes
















RTT 2i . (3.3)
In summary, to guarantee a certain bandwidth, CSi , to a (domain) path iden-
tifier Si in normal mode of router operation (i.e., when all flows, including bursty
ones, are legitimate), we count the number of active flows, ni, measure the average
2Note that, in general, for a given flow synchronization model (i.e., a window-size distribution),
the number of additional tokens need to be provided is proportional to the standard deviation of
the aggregate token request rate.
3This value is chosen under the assumption that n À 4.
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RTTi for that path identifier (viz., Section 3.5.1), and then set the token bucket pa-
rameters, namely the token generation period, TSi , and corresponding token bucket
size, NISi , as specified by Eqs. (3.1) and (3.3), respectively. Note that for these token
bucket parameters, the MTD(fi) =
Wi
2
RTTi = niTSi , as shown in the TCP Flow
Model above.
3.4.2 Attack-Flow Identification and Confinement
In this subsection, we describe how to identify attack paths and attack flows within
those paths by the packet drop intervals of flows, and how to limit the bandwidth
of those attack flows. Let FSi be a set of flows carrying path identifier Si, and
MTD(fi) be the “mean time to packet drop” of flow fi ∈ FSi . Then, MTD(fi) can
be written as MTD(fi) =
Wi
2
RTTi = niTSi in normal mode of operation (as shown
in the previous section). We define niTSi as the reference MTD of a flow carrying
(domain) path identifier Si.
3.4.2.1 Attack (Domains) Paths
For the paths that deliver attack flows (which we call “attack paths”), the MTD of
aggregate flows is lower than the token generation period while the request rate of Si
(λSi) is higher than the allocated bandwidth added by the reference drop rate of Si;
i.e., MTD(FSi) < TSi and λSi > CSi +1/TSi . This is because the MTDs of legitimate
flows is less than the reference MTD (due to the decrease of available bandwidth),
yet it is greater than those of attack flows; i.e., the MTDs of all flows are less than the
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reference MTD. Hence, attack paths can be identified by estimating the mean packet
drop rate of path-identifiers, which is the inverse of MTD. If allowed, attack paths
would over-utilize their bandwidth by exhausting the extra tokens made available
by the new, increased bucket size (defined above). To avoid such bandwidth over-
utilization, the fixed bucket size (NSi) is applied to path identifiers containing attack
flows instead of the new, increased ones (NISi). This strictly limits the bandwidth
available to attack paths.
3.4.2.2 Attack Flows
Though effective in localizing attack effects, bandwidth control on a (per-domain)
path identifier basis does not prevent all “collateral damage;” i.e., does not protect
legitimate flows that happen to be within an attack path. To protect these flows,
we introduce an attack-flow identification and control mechanism.
MTD Measurement. Let DfiSi(tj) be the number of packet drops of flow fi in
interval (tj−1, tj]. If we set tj − tj−1 = TSi , for some k > n, MTD(fi) under our








Since MTD(fi) is inversely proportional to the packet-drop rate of fi (which is
proportional to its send rate), the MTD of an attack flow is always lower than that
of a legitimate flow. This definition of MTD could identify attack flows showing
vastly different drop patterns (i.e., employing different attack strategies), since it
63
is measured over sufficient periods kTSi (viz., Eq. (3.4)) for estimating flows’ send
rates.
For the attack flows identified by their MTD, the congested router applies the
following packet admission policy to limit the bandwidths of those flows.






where ITSi(fi) equals 1, if a token is available to flow fi, and 0, otherwise.
This packet admission policy preferentially drops the packets belonging to at-
tack flows in proportion to their send rates, and more aggressively penalizes the
flows whose MTDs keep decreasing (i.e., flows that do not respond to packet drop




(α > 1) experiences d preferential packet drops, its effective band-
width at the congested link is α
CSi
ni
· Pr(fi is serviced) 6 α1−d CSini , since MTD(fi)
decreases proportionally to 1
α
on each preferential drop. Hence, whenever all flows
actively compete for the bandwidth allocated to a path identifier (i.e., no spon-
taneously under-subscribing flow exists), flow fi cannot use more bandwidth than
its fair amount within that path identifier allocation. Note that the above packet
admission policy would never deny service to the misidentified (attack) flows since
service to those flows would resume once the sources of those flows respond to packet
drops by decreasing their send rates; i.e., their MTD(fi) would keep increasing and
so would Pr(fi is serviced), as shown in Eq. (3.5).
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3.4.2.3 Confinement of Covert Attacks
Recall that, in a “covert” attack, each “bot” may coordinate a large number of
legitimate-looking (low-rate) flows to traverse a target link, concurrently. Covert
attacks can be extremely potent. For example, each of N bots on one side of the
targeted link can coordinate sending messages to and receiving messages from each
of N “bots” on the other side of that link so as to cause O(N2) link flows [SP09].
Individually, these O(N2) flows appear to be perfectly legitimate and yet collectively
they may deplete most of, if not all, that link’s bandwidth.
FLoc counters the effects of covert attacks in two ways. First, FLoc limits the
number of flows that a source can make with different IP destinations through the
flooded link by constructing a flow’s capability as follows.
Let Cfs,d be the capability for a flow fs,d between a source s and a destination
d. Cfs,d consists of two parts, namely Cfs,d = C
0
fs,d
||C1fs,d . Here, Ckfs,d for k ∈ {0,1}
is defined as:
C0fs,d = Hash(IPs, IPd, Si, K
1
R)
C1fs,d = Hash(IPs, F(IPd), Si, K
2
R)





router’s secret keys, and F(·) is a function whose output is randomly uniform on [0,




fier authenticity to flows [YPS04,YWA08]. Capabilities C1fs,d enable a router to (1)
65
restrict the number of flows per source to nmax, and (2) account for the total band-
width requested using those capabilities at that router concurrently. Thus sources
with a high fanout of legitimate, low-rate, concurrent flows would be identified as
sources of high-rate, covert attack flows within a router.
Second, FLoc confines such covert attacks to individual domains by avoid-
ing aggregation of legitimate path identifiers that have widely different numbers of
flows (viz., Section 3.4.3.2). A brief analysis of FLoc’s handling of covert attacks is
presented in Section 3.6.5.
3.4.3 Differential Bandwidth Guarantees
In this subsection, we present a mechanism that provides path identifiers with differ-
ential bandwidth guarantees based on a “conformance” measure for path identifiers.
We define the “conformance” of a path identifier Si ending at router Ri in a time
interval (tk−1, tk] as the fraction of the legitimate flows in Si. We denoted this
“path-conformance” by ERi and express it as a moving average of ERi values. That
is,
ERi(tk) = βconf (1−
nai
ni
) + (1− βconf )ERi(tk−1) (3.6)
where ni and n
a
i are the number of active flows and attack flows forwarded by
Ri; and βconf is a constant smoothing factor (0 < βconf < 1).
Based on this path-conformance measure, a router performs (1) attack-path
aggregation to maximize goodput at the flooded link and (2) legitimate-path aggre-
66
gation to counter potential unfair bandwidth allocation to flows of legitimate paths.
For these aggregations, the congested router R0 builds the traffic tree (TR0) using
the path identifiers carried in the “active” flows and decomposes it into two sub-
trees, namely an attack tree (T AR0) and a legitimate tree (T LR0). T AR0 is constructed by
removing the leaf nodes whose path conformance is greater than a certain threshold
(Eth) from TR0 ; and T LR0 is constructed by removing the leaf nodes present in T AR0
from TR0 .
3.4.3.1 Attack-Path Aggregation
The goal of attack-path aggregation is to provide bandwidth guarantees to legitimate
paths despite wide dispersion of attack “bots” over a large number of domains.
This is achieved by aggregating the path identifiers of highly contaminated domains
and hence limiting the number of bandwidth-guaranteed path identifiers. Path
identifier aggregation starts from the nearby domains (i.e., domains with longest
prefix-matching path identifiers) to (1) localize attack effects within these domains
and (2) avoid mixing flows having highly different RTT delays (as this would affect
FLoc’s precision in estimating token-bucket parameters; viz., discussion in Section
3.5.1). Whenever the number of path identifiers is bounded by |S|max, the attack-
path aggregation problem can be defined as the path-conformance maximization
problem below.
Let R be the set of all nodes in T AR0 , and Ri be the set of leaf nodes of a
subtree rooted at Ri ∈ T AR0 (i.e., T ARi). And, let SL and SA be the set of legitimate
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and attack path-identifiers respectively. Then, the path-conformance maximization
problem is defined as:















where IRi is the indicator function which equals 1, if paths are aggregated at Ri, and
0, otherwise. For a non-aggregated path, IRi is 1 at the leaf node. Since
∑
Si∈S IRi
is the total number of attack path identifiers seen at node R0, it should be bounded
by |S|max − |SL| for the bandwidth guarantees on SL.
In the above equation, aggregation at router Ri decreases the path-conformance
by |Ri|−1|Ri|
∑
Rj∈Ri ERj , which we define as the “aggregation cost” and denote by
CA(Ri). Hence, a set of nodes at which aggregating path-identifiers has the min-
imum (overall) aggregation cost and reduces at least |SA| − (|S|max − |SL|) path-
identifiers, would be a solution to the above problem. The above aggregation prob-
lem is exactly same as the problem defined for differential link-access guarantees
for capability requests in Section 2.6.2 (viz., Eq. (2.4)). Hence, it is solved using
Algorithm 1 presented in Section 2.6.3.
3.4.3.2 Legitimate-Path Aggregation
The aggregation of legitimate paths is intended to achieve proportional bandwidth
allocation to “legitimate” path identifiers that have different numbers of flows; i.e.,
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fair bandwidth allocation to flows. In aggregation, a (congested) router assigns a
new path-identifier to the aggregated paths and allocates its bandwidth proportional
to the number of aggregated paths. Consequently, the path conformance of the
aggregated path would be the weighted average of individual paths’ conformance
measures, where the weighting factor is the number of domains’ flows.
Let CL(Ri) be the net change of path-conformance after the aggregation of
paths at Ri. Then, C











A negative value of CL(Ri) means that the aggregation of paths at Ri would
increase the path-conformance, and, eventually, the goodput of the flooded link.
Hence, aggregation would be performed at all nodes in T LR0 whose cost is negative.4
However, if a covert-attack path (viz., Section 3.4.2.3 and [SP09]) is inadver-
tently aggregated with a (truly) legitimate path, a large number of legitimate-looking
flows of the covert path may soak the bandwidth [XG05] of (truly) legitimate flows.
To avoid this, FLoc does not aggregate legitimate paths whenever aggregation would
increase bandwidth allocation to any path by more than a fraction of its current
value; e.g., in our simulation this fraction is set to 50%.5 Thus aggregation would
never take place for path identifiers that have widely different numbers of flows.
4However, FLoc does not aggregate paths that have significant discrepancies in RTT delays as
such aggregations would lead to false identification of attack flows.
5Typically, ISPs over-provision network link capacity to maintain link utilization under 40 –
50% in normal operating conditions, and under 75% in the presence of a single link failure. Hence,




In this section, we describe how our model of dependable link-access is implemented
in a router. Specifically, we describe the packet admission (and drop) policies based
on the token-bucket mechanism and the management of the router’s buffer queue.
3.5.1 Token-Bucket Activation and Router Queue Manage-
ment
The token bucket parameters (i.e., token generation pattern and bucket size) for
a path-identifier depend quadratically on the actual RTTi of a path identifier Si
(viz., Eqs. (3.1) – (3.3)). Since the actual RTTi can only be approximated, we
estimate its value by (1) averaging the measured RTT of individual flows in a path,
and (2) adjusting that average downward to avoid an over-estimate (e.g., we divide
the average RTT of a path by 2 in the simulations reported in the next section).
Note that an over-estimate of the actual RTTi would inflate the token generation
period and bucket size substantially, thereby causing bandwidth over-utilization and
overflows of the router buffer queue. In contrast, an under-estimate would deflate
the token-bucket parameters and potentially cause unnecessary packet drops for a
path identifier. FLoc implements a control mechanism that adjusts the packet-drop
rate and compensates for any unnecessary packet drops (discussed below).
RTTi measurement. We measure the average RTT of a path Si at a router
by averaging the individual flows’ RTTs for that path. A flow’s RTT is measured
as the time between a client’s connection (i.e., capability) request and its first data
70
transmission. The elapsed time from a capability issue by a router to a client
to the client’s first use of the issued capability at that router is a fairly accurate
measurement of an individual flow’s RTT.
Router-Queue Management. The management of a router’s buffer queue
establishes the service rate for path identifiers and, as such, it implements the band-
width guarantees provided by the token-bucket mechanism for each path identifier.
FLoc implements a router’s (FIFO) queue whose size varies in the interval [Qmin,
Qmax]. Qmin is a configurable parameter chosen to avoid both link under-utilization
(which could be caused by short bursts of packets) and long queuing delays; viz.,
the RED queue. (We set Qmin to 20% of buffer size in the simulations of Section
3.6.) To determine Qmax, recall that the token requests of partially synchronized

















niWi packet buffer space for Si to avoid link under-utilization. Hence, we





Floc computes the total number of queue buffers requested in a time period,
Qcurr, and uses it to manage the buffer queue in three modes of operation, namely (a)
uncongested mode, where Qcurr 6 Qmin; (b) congested mode, where Qmin < Qcurr 6
Qmax; and flooding mode, where Qcurr > Qmax. The activation of the token-bucket
mechanism begins in the congested mode (b) with the initial parameters for a path
identifier Si set to TSi and N
I
Si
, respectively (viz., Eqs. (3.1) and (3.3)).
Uncongested Mode. If Qcurr 6 Qmin, all packets are serviced regardless of to-
ken availability. The router’s buffer queue tolerates temporary bursts of traffic until
packet arrivals fill it. Link under-utilization, which may be caused by unnecessary
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packet drops, is avoided. However, attack-path flows may still appear in this mode
and consume more buffers (and higher bandwidth) than legitimate flows until the
router queue reaches Qmin. In this case, FLoc forces entry in congested mode as
soon as Qcurr > Qmin ×min{1, CSiλSi }, where λSi is the request rate of path Si. This
test leads to the activation of the token-bucket mechanism for attack path identifiers
early, and causes them to experience packet drops before legitimate ones.
Congested Mode. If Qmin < Qcurr 6 Qmax, the token-bucket controls are
activated for all path identifiers in the queue. However, since FLoc underestimates
the token-buffer parameters (as discussed above), some path identifiers may expe-
rience unnecessary packet drops. To avoid penalizing legitimate path identifiers
with unnecessary drops, FLoc implements a random-drop (i.e., neutral) policy in
congested mode, instead of a targeted per-path drop policy, as required by the
(under-estimated) token-buffer parameters. That is, if a packet does not get a to-
ken on its arrival, a queue threshold value, Qth, is picked at random between Qmin
and Qmax, and the packet is dropped only if Qcurr > Qth.
6 The random drops end
when the uncongested mode is re-entered, namely when Qcurr 6 Qmin.
Flooding Mode. If Qcurr > Qmax, then either traffic bursts or unresponsive
and/or attack flows persist. In either case, FLoc applies the packet-admission (drop)
policy (viz., Eq. 4.5) defined by the token-bucket mechanism with the bucket size




Handling Attack Flows. To compute the flows’ MTD, FLoc maintains a
6The random threshold (Qth) functions as an early congestion notification much like the RED
queue (the drop probability goes up as the queue length grows), yet it does not require complex
parameter calibration as the RED queue does.
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packet-drop history table (PDHT) whose entries comprise the flow identifier (fi),
MTD(fi), drop count (D
fi
Si
), the last update time (tl(fi)) and the expiration time
(tx(fi)) of an entry. FLoc implements the following simple mechanism for MTD
accounting.
Suppose that a packet drop on fi occurs at time t. If fi already has an entry
in PDHT, we update the entry as follows.




(t− tl(fi) + (DfiSi − 1) ·MTD(fi))
tx(fi) = tx(fi) + nMTD(FSi)
tl(fi) = t
If fi does not exist in PDHT, a new entry for fi is created, and tl(fi) is




RTTi. Since we only need to keep track of attack flows, a table entry whose
MTD(fi) is greater than the reference MTD (niTSi) expires and can be replaced by
a new flow. Once an attack takes place, the MTDs of both legitimate and attack
flows drop below the reference MTD, yet an attack flow’s MTD would be much
lower than that of a legitimate flow.
Restricting the bandwidth of attack flows secures more bandwidth for the
legitimate flows and hence leads to legitimate flows’ MTD increases. Based on this
observation, we apply the packet admission policy defined by Eq. (3.5) only to
those flows that (1) have smaller MTD than the average MTD of a path, and (2)
have experienced packet drops at least W times. As attack flows are penalized, a
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legitimate flow’s MTD approaches, or exceeds, the reference MTD.
3.6 Simulation Results
In this section, we present our ns2 simulation results for various attack scenarios to
evaluate our design. We use the tree topology shown in Figure 3.2, where both the
height and degree of the tree are set to three (i.e., 27 paths). We attach 30 legitimate
(TCP) sources to every leaf node, and attach 60 additional attack sources to each
of 6 leaf nodes designated as attack nodes (i.e., we use 360 attack sources). Each
legitimate source is configured to send a 12MB file to a destination server located
across the link targeted for flooding and randomly starts its transmission between
zero and five seconds. Each attack source is configured to change the send rate
from one to ten times its fair bandwidth depending on the simulation scenario. The



















Figure 3.2: Simulation Topology
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3.6.1 Attack Confinement
We illustrate the attack-confinement effects (e.g., bandwidth guarantees to legiti-
mate path identifiers) during link flooding for three different types of attacks: a
high-population TCP attack (Figure 3.3(a)), a Constant Bit Rate (CBR) attack
(Figure 3.3(b)), and a Shrew attack (Figure 3.3(c)) [XG05]. The aim of the high-
population TCP attack is to reduce the bandwidth of legitimate flows at a congested
router. These flows adapt their send rate to the available bandwidth and as a con-
sequence become indistinguishable from legitimate flows at that router. However,
FLoc confines the effect of this attack to a single path identifier, since bandwidth is
separately guaranteed to each path. As Floc guarantees the same bandwidth allo-
cation to each of the 27 paths shown in Figure 3.2 (i.e., 500 Mbps / 27 = 18.5 Mbps
per path), the bandwidths received by individual path identifiers shown in Figure
3.3(a) are almost identical regardless of their (legitimate or attack) population.
In the CBR attack, each of the 360 attack sources (i.e., “bots”) sends 2 Mbps
CBR traffic through the targeted link. Thus the overall attack strength reaches 720
Mbps – an amount that would disrupt most legitimate TCP flows through a 500
MBps link. Figure 3.3(b) shows that the legitimate-path flows get higher bandwidth
in this attack than in the high-population TCP attack. This is because the token-
bucket mechanism is activated early for attack paths and the fixed (non-increased)
token-bucket sizes limit the traffic on these paths. At the same time, attack flows
are easily identified by their low MTDs and are rate-limited accordingly.
In the Shrew attack, each attack source sends 2 Mbps traffic only during
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0.25RTT seconds within an interval of RTT seconds. Also, we coordinate all attack
sources to maximize the attack strength. Figure 3.3(c) shows that the bandwidths
received by the flows of a legitimate path are almost identical to (or slightly higher
than) those received by legitimate flows in the CBR attack. This means that the
Shrew attack is handled at least as well as the CBR attack. Yet, the service rate has
a higher variance during the Shrew attack. This is because flows that experience
packet drops synchronized with the attack traffic utilize less bandwidth than the
unsynchronized flows.
3.6.2 Robustness of Bandwidth Guarantees
We use the distribution of the bandwidth received by legitimate flows in legitimate
paths to illustrate the robustness of FLoc’s bandwidth guarantees under various
attack strengths. The strength of FLoc in this area is compared with that of an
aggregate-based defense scheme (i.e., Pushback [MBF+02]) and a flow-based defense
scheme (i.e., RED-PD [MFW01]). Figure 3.4 shows the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the bandwidth received by the flows of legitimate paths (measured
in a 20 to 80 second interval) for various attack strengths. (The send rate of each
attack source specified in each graph’s legend is increased starting from 0.2 Mbps.)7
In Floc’s case (Figure 3.4(a), the bandwidth distributions to flows of legitimate paths
are nearly identical for various attack strengths, and the mean bandwidth is close
to the ideal fair bandwidth; i.e., 18.5 Mbps for each of the 30 legitimate paths yields
7We illustrate the bandwidth distribution of all flows in legitimate paths since the link band-
width is allocated in equal amounts to all 27 paths (i.e., 18.5 Mbps per path). Also, we increase
the send rate of each attack source starting from 0.2 Mbps, since this is the fair per-flow bandwidth
allocation in attack paths (i.e., 18.5 Mbps / (60 attack + 30 legitimate flows)= 0.205 Mbps / flow).
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0.617 Mbps per legitimate flow. Also, FLoc provides per-flow fairness comparable
to that of the RED queue in normal (no-attack) case (viz., Figure 3.4(c)). RED-
PD outperforms Pushback slightly in low-rate attacks, namely when overall rates
are less than 500 Mbps, yet both RED-PD and Pushback do not provide effective
protection to legitimate flows; viz., Figures. 3.4(b),3.4(c) where their CDF curves
move left and drop below the “no attack” curve.
3.6.3 Effects of Different Path Delays on Bandwidth Guar-
antees
Next, we perform a simulation about the effects of different path delays (i.e.,RTTis)
on the bandwidth guarantees. In principle, TCP flows having low RTTi s would
consume more bandwidth than those having a high RTTis. Yet, this RTTi effect on
the flow bandwidth is expected to be insignificant with our scheme since our token
bucket mechanism is designed in consideration of flow RTTis. For this simulation,
we change the link delays of attack paths by the amount of ∆Delay (e.g., -15ms,
+35ms and +85ms as shown in Table 3.1) as compared with those of the legitimate
paths, and observe how the different link delays8 affect the bandwidth guarantees.
As Table 3.1 shows, with our scheme, low RTTi attack sources do not make any
distinguishable effect on the flows in the legitimate paths. Meanwhile, for the case
∆Delay = -15ms, the less bursty nature of low RTTi flows (due to smaller TCP
window sizes) allows more bandwidth to the legitimate flows in attack paths. With
8Different path-delay configuration can be considered as the attack domains at different loca-
tions in the Internet.
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Pushback and RED-PD, close attack sources to the destination significantly affects
the bandwidth of the legitimate flows in attack paths (20 – 30% throughput loss as
compared with that under remote attacks).
Table 3.1: Flow bandwidth for different RTTis. FgLP denotes the set of legitimate
flows in Legitimate Paths and FgAP denotes the set of legitimate flows in Attack
Paths. ∆Delay is the attack paths’ link delays relative to those of the legitimate
paths. The mean and standard deviation of bandwidth are given in Mbps.
∆Delay
fi ∈ FgLP fi ∈ FgAP fi ∈ Fa
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
FLoc
-15ms 0.615 0.128 0.424 0.086 0.065 0.007
35ms 0.582 0.097 0.397 0.107 0.042 0.013
85ms 0.600 0.095 0.399 0.135 0.0291 0.006
Pushback
-15ms 0.216 0.057 0.009 0.007 0.932 0.446
35ms 0.303 0.071 0.010 0.008 0.786 0.452
85ms 0.311 0.066 0.008 0.006 0.767 0.435
RED-PD
-15ms 0.199 0.035 0.190 0.034 0.883 0.100
35ms 0.249 0.037 0.144 0.027 0.850 0.079
85ms 0.255 0.035 0.113 0.028 0.853 0.083
3.6.4 Differential Bandwidth Guarantees
Next, we evaluate the differential bandwidth guarantees achieved by FLoc’s path-
aggregation policies. We set the maximum number of bandwidth-guaranteed paths
to 25 (i.e., |S|max = 25 of the 27 paths) and allocate 20 Mbps bandwidth to each
of them. This requires at least three out of six attack path identifiers of the con-
taminated domains in Figure 3.2 to be aggregated at the congested router. For
legitimate-path aggregation, we place 15 legitimate-flow sources in each one of three
sibling nodes (domains) and 30 legitimate sources in the other nodes. Since a third
of 21 uncontaminated domains have 15 sources (i.e., 105 sources in all) and the
others have 30 sources (i.e., 420 sources in all), there would be 525 flows originating
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from legitimate domains at the congested router.
Figure 3.5 shows that without aggregation, nearly 80% of the legitimate-path
flows receive less bandwidth than the other 20% of the flows (viz., the CDF marked
by upward-pointing triangles). This implies that the flows of less populated paths
(i.e., domains), which account for 105/525 = 20% of all legitimate flows, consume
much more bandwidth (i.e., two times more in our simulation) than those of highly
populated paths (domains). This uneven bandwidth distribution disappears when
legitimate-path aggregation is performed (viz., the CDF marked by circles).
Attack-path aggregation unavoidably penalizes legitimate flows of an attack
path to some extent9 (but never denies link access to them). Since three attack paths
are aggregated by the constraint of |S|max=25, the legitimate flows of the aggregated
attack paths only get a third of the fair bandwidth allocated to each path identifier.
As the figure shows, these flows, which account for half of all legitimate flows of
attack paths, receive somewhat less bandwidth than the legitimates flows of non-
aggregated attack paths, and certainly less bandwidth than the legitimate-path flows
– the expected result of differential bandwidth guarantees.
Figure 3.6 illustrates a comparison between the differential bandwidth guar-
antees provided by FLoc, and the bandwidths provided by Pushback and RED-PD,
at different attack rates.
With FLoc, the bandwidth received by the flows of legitimate paths is over
80% of the link bandwidth, which is nearly identical to the proportion of legitimate
9This is the case for all aggregate-based defenses, including those where a priori information
regarding the legitimacy of a flow path is given, such as CDF-PSP [CLSS08].
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paths (i.e., 21/25 = 0.84). Recall that there are twice as many attack sources as
legitimate sources in contaminated domains. Consequently, the total bandwidth
used by attack flows is higher than that of legitimate flows in the same paths (i.e.,
attack paths) even though per-flow bandwidth is higher for legitimate flows (viz.,
FLoc under 0.2 and 0.4 Mbps attacks in Figure 3.6). As attack sources increase
their send rates, the traffic from those sources are more aggressively rate-limited by
FLoc’s preferential drop policy. This leaves more bandwidth for legitimate flows in
attack paths, while the bandwidth of legitimate-path flows remains unaffected. With
Pushback, the bandwidth of legitimate-path flows decreases until the attack traffic
dominates the link bandwidth and the packet-drop rate triggers the activation of
rate throttling (i.e., in a “bandwidth soaking” attack [XG05]). Once rate throttling
is performed, the bandwidth of the legitimate-path flows increases (viz., the last four
bars for Pushback in Figure 3.6). However, the bandwidth of the legitimate flows in
attack paths decreases significantly, since Pushback does not implement any per-flow
measure to counter attack traffic; i.e., “collateral damage” within attack aggregates
is unavoidable. RED-PD limits the bandwidth of attack flows more than Pushback
for low-rate attacks, and protects legitimate flows in attack paths for all attack
strengths. However, RED-PD is less effective in protecting legitimate-path flows
(whose bandwidth is shown as white bars in the figure) than Pushback, when the
send rates of attack sources are very high (e.g., 3.2 and 4.0 Mbps). This is because
RED-PD allocates the same bandwidth to flows (including extraordinarily high-
rate, attack flows) regardless of their send rates. FLoc outperforms both Pushback
and RED-PD, both in terms of the bandwidth guaranteed to legitimate traffic and
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link-bandwidth utilization for all attacks rates.
3.6.5 Covert Attacks
We evaluate the effect of covert attacks, where attack sources establish a large
number of “legitimate-looking” flows through the congested link with “different IP
destinations”, on FLoc, Pushback and RED-PD. For this simulation, we configure
attack sources to connect with multiple destinations and to send low-rate CBR
traffic (i.e., 0.2 Mbps per flow) to each destination to make individual attack flows
look “legitimate”. (Recall that 0.2 Mbps is the fair bandwidth of each flow in attack
paths; viz., Section 3.6.2.) The number of destinations to which an attack source
connects concurrently within a router is increased from 1 to 20,which increases the
send rate of individual attack sources from 0.2 Mbps to 4.0 Mbps. Note that since
we use 360 attack sources in this simulation, the targeted link is already completely
flooded at 7 connections per source (i.e., 360 × 7 × 0.2 Mbps = 504 Mbps which
exceeds the link capacity of 500 Mbps). To illustrate the use of our covert attack
countermeasures, we restrict the maximum number of concurrent connections per
single source within a single router 2 (i.e., two capabilities are made available to each
multi-flow source, namely nmax = 2
10), thereby limiting the bandwidth available to
attack sources to 28.8% of the total link bandwidth. Of course, a source’s multiple
connections through multiple routers are not affected by this restriction.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the bandwidth used by legitimate and attack flows at
10We note that nmax = 2 is used only for the purposes of illustrating comparative performance
analysis. We let nmax be a configurable parameter that can be differently chosen at different
locations (i.e., routers).
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the flooded link. Whenever an attack source increases the number of concurrent
connections (i.e. flows) through a single target link, its legitimate-looking flows are
classified as a single high-rate flow by FLoc. Hence, packets of the attack source
are preferentially dropped at that router, much like those of CBR attack sources
illustrated in the previous section. Pushback’s reaction to these attacks is too late to
make a difference. Its rate-control mechanism is triggered only at 12 flows per attack
source when the maximum available link bandwidth is already exceeded by 52%
(i.e., 360 × 12 × 0.2 Mbps = 864 Mbps vs. 500 Mbps maximum link bandwidth).
Furthermore, Pushback neither prevents collateral damage within attack paths nor
does it handle low-rate attacks (e.g., covert attacks whose total send rate is well
below the maximum link bandwidth). RED-PD fails to counter covert attacks since
bandwidth it provides to legitimate flows decreases as the number of attack flows
increases. For example, when an attack source directs 16 concurrent connections
through a single router, 810 legitimate and 16 × 360 = 5760 attack flows co-exist in
that router. Hence, per-flow, fair bandwidth allocation provides more than 87.7% of
the link bandwidth to attack flows.11 This illustrates the lethality of covert attacks
against typical schemes that act on either flow-aggregate or individual-flow basis
to counter flooding attacks. Clearly, fair bandwidth allocation mechanisms cannot
possibly counter such covert attacks.
11Legitimate TCP flows cannot fully utilize the allocated bandwidth due to their congestion
control mechanism. This is why they use less than 10% of the link bandwidth in the simulation.
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(a) High-population TCP attack
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Figure 3.3: Localization effects for three different attacks. Legitimate and attack
paths are randomly chosen from 27 paths.
Legend: For each path identifier, “Service” denotes the bandwidth received, and
“Arrival” the bandwidth requested
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of legitimate path flows’ band-
width for various CBR attack rates.
Note: For FLoc, the bandwidth of legitimate-path flows has nearly identical dis-
tribution independent of attack strength. In contrast, for Pushback and RED-PD,
this bandwidth decreases significantly (i.e., the CDF curve moves left) as the attack
strength increases.
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Attack Flows
Flow Bandwidth (Mbps)
Figure 3.5: Differential Guarantees: Legitimate vs. Attack Flows.
Legend: The CDFs labeled by “Aggr” illustrate the results of path-identifier aggre-
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Figure 3.6: Differential bandwidth used at flooded link. (Flow rates of each attack
source are shown on the horizontal axis.)
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Legitimate Flows in Legitimate Paths
Legitimate Flows in Attack Paths
Attack Flows
Figure 3.7: Bandwidth used at the flooded link under covert attacks.
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Chapter 4
A Collaborative Defense against Link
Flooding Attacks
4.1 Outline of the Chapter
In Section 4.2, we give a brief overview of related work. Then, we motivate our
design and present an overview of our router-based defense scheme that consists of
multipath routing, path-pinning and source-end rate control mechanisms in Section
4.3. We describe the implementation details of route control mechanisms and the
rate allocation and control mechanism in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we simulate the
potential side-effects of link-flooding attacks and provide simulation results showing
that our scheme effectively mitigates those effects.
4.2 Related Work
Traffic Filters. Most of previous countermeasures against link flooding attacks work
in a reactive way, which is seemingly reasonable since such flooding attacks occur
rarer than usual. Generally, a reactive defense mechanism operates by identifying
the flows or flow aggregates contributing to congestion and then installing filters or
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rate-limiters on those flows. Attempts to handle attack traffic near its target have
their strength in dealing with timed attacks (e.g., on-off and rolling attacks) and
have no deployment obstacle since they can work independently. However, the side-
effects of attacks on the way to the target (so called collateral damage to legitimate
traffic [IB02]) cannot be handled by a sole, destination-end defense mechanism,
and imprecise information on potential attack sources (due to spoofing or reflection
attacks) limits their effectiveness. Installing filters close to the attack sources, either
in a recursive way [IB02] or via a direct request to the domains that originate attack
traffic [AC05a,SAM07,LYL08], would significantly mitigates collateral damages by
preventing those attack traffic from being injected into the Internet. Yet, near-
source filtering, despite its effectiveness, is less promising due to its lack of incentive
to collaborating parties as pure source-end defenses [MPR02,GP01] are.
Address Authenticity. Recent capability-based approaches proactively pre-
vent link flooding attacks by authorizing flows before they establish a connection.
Network-layer capability, which is initially proposed in [ARW03] and extended
in [YPS04,YWA05,YWA08], has great significance in preventing address spoofing
and filtering out unwanted traffic at the packet destinations. Yet, another approach
is to design an accountable Internet Protocol (e.g., [ABF+08]). However, in the
absence of strong authentication mechanism at the network-layer (which is imprac-
tical at this layer), network links are still vulnerable to the flooding attacks from a
large number of compromised machines that use valid (meaning accountable) source
identifiers.
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Multipath Routing. Different from conventional defensive countermeasures
that secure legitimate flows by filtering attack traffic, a variety of route-based ap-
proaches aim to avoid congestion by forwarding legitimate flows through less con-
gested paths [XR06, AC04, ABKM01, YW06]. These approaches, though they dif-
fer in implementation details, commonly utilize path multiplicity of the Internet
to avoid congestion in a source (domain) controlled manner. However, the path
diversity could also be exploited by attack flows in the absence of a precise flow
discrimination mechanism, whereby legitimate and attack flows are distinguished
and then differentially routed.
4.3 Design Overview
In this section, we describe the basic mechanisms of our router-based defense scheme
against link flooding attacks. Our defense scheme consists of three independent
yet complementary functions, which are multipath routing, path pinning and rate
control.
4.3.1 Problem Statement
Our defense scheme against link-flooding attacks is intended to localize the effects
of attacks within a specified locale (e.g., a domains or neighboring domains), and at
the same time, mitigate their potential side-effects in two ways: multipath routing
and source-end rate-control. In principle, attack localization can be achieved if a
traffic source would embed the path identifier into the packets it forwards and the
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congested router allocates its resources in a per path-identifier basis. However, its
effectiveness would be limited if (1) legitimate domains are located near highly con-
taminated region, and/or (2) frequent route changes occur due to link state changes
(e.g., link failure). In the former case, flows from legitimate domains could expe-
rience significant congestion before reaching at the destination where per-domain
bandwidth control is performed. Whereas, in the latter case, both inter-domain
and intra-domain route changes would allow attack traffic to affect other legitimate
traffic irrelevant to attacks, widening attack effects. We mitigate those undesirable
effects of flooding attacks by introducing a complementary routing policies (i.e.,
multipath routing and path pinning) as both problems are related to the routing
policies in the Internet.
Even if new routing policies could localize/mitigate the attack effects to a sig-
nificant extent, they are insufficient as the collateral damage to the legitimate flows
sharing the same paths with those flows are unavoidable. Countering such collateral
damage requires a source-end defense mechanism [SAM07,AC05a,MPR02]. Yet, de-
ploying such countermeasures are less promising if no tangible/substantail benefit
could be provided to the cooperating source domains. We argue that providing in-
centives to cooperating source domains is crucial for DoS defense, and hence design
a rate-allocation and control mechanism favoring flows from such domains, i.e., a
mechanism for rewarding policy-compliant domains.
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4.3.2 Assumptions
We assume that every packet carries the path-identifier described in Section 2.3.2
in its header. We use this path-identifier as a domain identifier mainly because it is
secure (meaning unforgeable) and does not require universal deployment. We also
assume that each domain has private-public key pair that is certified by a trusted
third party (e.g., ICANN).
4.3.3 Multipath Routing
In rerouting legitimate flows, we utilize the multiplicity of inter-domain paths (AS
paths) for at least a couple of reasons: (1) AS paths are spontaneously disclosed in
the BGP protocol and hence no extra protocol or protocol change for path disclosure
is required, and (2) the stability of AS paths (since they are determined by a path-
vector protocol and the policies of individual domains) renders the effects of path
change predictable, hence could make such path control effective.
AS path diversity is comprehensively explored in MIRO [XR06], which evi-
dences that most of the domains (at least 95% of 300 million AS pairs tested) have
alternate paths when 1-hop immediate neighbors’ are counted (we will explain how
those paths can be used below). Motivated by MIRO, we utilize the path multiplic-
ity in an end-to-end (in terms of domain) controlled manner – we call it mutually
controlled multipath routing – rather than a neighbor-negotiable way presented in
MIRO. End-to-end path control has its strength in handling attacks since a traffic




























































Figure 4.1: Multipath Routing : AS3 is an uncontaminated domain whose traffic is
to be directed to an alternative path, and AS4 is a contaminated domain that sends
attack traffic. (a) AS3 selects a different provider (AS5) in forwarding packets to
the congested link, instead of AS2 (which has shorter AS path length to AS1). (b)
The provider AS (AS2) forwards the packets received from AS3 to a different path
(i.e., through AS5).
out actively probing the network conditions (e.g., delay, packet drops) for specific
destination prefixes (which is nearly impractical in the absence of any signaling
mechanism by destinations) and no protocol extension for on-line path negotiation
is required to BGP routers.
The mutually controlled inter-domain routing works as follows.
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Request from Destination. In order to reroute the traffic originating from an
uncontaminated domain experiencing severe congestion, a congested (or attacked)
domain issues a reroute request to the source domain. The reroute request includes
the domains to be avoided in the forwarding path and the list of preferred domains
(ordered by their priority) through which arriving traffic would experience less con-
gestion.
Routing at Source. On receiving a reroute request, the source domain refers
its routing table to find an alternate path to reach the destination via the requested
route. If such path does not exist, the source AS selects another path that excludes
the domains to be avoided. The alternate path found in BGP table is set to the
default path for the destination prefix. The control message for multipath routing
is exchanged between “route controllers” located in individual domains, where the
route controller communicates with all BGP routers in its own domain to gather
congestion information and apply route selection policies. We will describe the
implementation details in section 4.4.1.
For a single-homed source domain (i.e., when no alternate path is available at
the source domain), the congested domain requests rerouting to its provider that
usually has multiple connections to tier-1 or tier-2 ASes, or is a tier-2 AS in itself.
A provider AS, if it provides service to both contaminated and uncontaminated
domains (as shown in Fig. 4.1(b)) should be able to forward only legitimate traffic
(informed by the congested domain) to an alternate path, forwarding the traffic
received from others (those domains could be classified as contaminated or have
lower service priority at the destination) through the default path. Such differential
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routing service can be provided to a customer AS by setting up a tunnel for a specific
destination prefix to the designated next hop AS and forwarding others through the
default path (e.g., AS2 forwards AS3’s traffic to AS5, while leaving other’s (AS4)
to follow the default path via AS6).
4.3.4 Path Pinning
While utilizing path diversity for legitimate traffic, we need to prevent attack (or
suspicious) traffic from being benefited by it. During flooding attacks, routes to the
target link may exhibit the intrinsic path diversity of the Internet in several ways:
a BGP session failure due to a severe congestion (or a flooding attack) causes a
route withdrawal that makes the upstream AS choose an alternate path, link-state
changes (e.g., link failure) within a domain could shift traffic to follow an alternate
(intra-domain) path, and intra-domain path changes could propagates to other ASs.
Such route changes are undesirable because route changes would shift attack traffic
to other paths, making their effects reach at other legitimate flows. We counter
those problems by pinning the routes of attack flows in the same controlled manner
as the multipath routing presented in the previous section.
A congested domain sends path-pinning requests for high-rate attack flows to
source/provider domains that originate/forward those flows (we will explain how to
identify high-rate attack flows in Section 4.4.3.1). Whenever the route controller
of a source domain receives a path-pinning request, it configures the BGP routers
of the domain to suppress any route update message on the requested destination
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prefixes, received from downstream domains. This leaves the default route to the
destination prefixes unchanged. If a path-pinning request is made to a provider,
the provider constructs a tunnel for the flows destined to the flooded link, which
minimizes the collateral effects of those traffic.
4.3.5 Rate Control
The effects of flooding attacks can be mitigated by multipath routing and path
pinning, yet those effects still persist unless attack flows are blocked near their
origin. For example, legitimate flows originating from highly contaminated domains
would share their fate with attack flows in the absence of precise flow distinction
(between legitimate and attack flows) and corresponding authorization mechanism.
Besides the collateral damage to the flows of the same domain of origin, attack
flows would also affect other flows having different destination prefixes once they
leave their origin [IB02]. Ideally, it is desired to block attack traffic near their origin
as implemented in Pushback [IB02] and AITF [AC05a]. However, previous near
source rate-control and filtering schemes are less attractive because they lack any
positive incentive to cooperating source domains.
To encourage source-end treatment of attack traffic, we propose an end-to-end
flow classification and throttling mechanism, where source domains determines the
service priorities of flows guided by a congested domain; and, based on the priority,
the congested router (in the congested domain) controls the flows’ bandwidth. The
basic mechanism works as follows. The route controller of a congested domain
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requests a source/provider domain controller to classify flows into three categories
– high priority, low priority, and to be filtered – by providing two threshold values
(i.e., Bthmin and B
th
max). The egress router(s) of the source domain marks zero on
the packets heading to the congested link at a rate of Bthmin (high priority); one
at a cumulative rate of Bthmax (low priority); and two on the remaining packets.
The congested router would offer guaranteed services to the high priority packets, a
best effort service to low priority packets, and drop the other packets if congestion
persists. The congested router implements separate queues for three different classes
of flows, and places packets to the corresponding queues based on their marking. As
such, the congested router provides additional bandwidth (though not guaranteed)
to the packets of marking compliant domains that would otherwise be dropped.
We envision that the above rate-control scheme would provide sufficient de-
ployment incentive to source domains for several reasons. For example, source-
/provider domains (1) can provide better service to selective customers, (2) do not
need to strictly limit outgoing traffic rate on behalf of other domains, and (3) would
be allocated more bandwidth at the flooded link by conforming to a marking request.
4.4 Architecture
In this section, we describe the network architecture and implementation details for
performing the desired functions presented in the previous section.
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4.4.1 Route Controller
Our route-based defense mechanism against flooding attacks introduces a specialized
server, named “route controller”, in each domain to control traffic routes. Route
controllers have different roles depending on its location. The route controller of a
congested domain is responsible for handling congestion notification from its domain
routers and sending route control message to source/provider domain controllers.
A rerouting message is sent to uncontaminated domains, and a path-pinning and
packet marking (classification) messages are sent to contaminated domains. The
recipient of route control message identifies the BGP routers that can handle the
message and configures the routers to direct flows to the flooded link as requested.
Fig. 4.2 illustrates these route-control message flows. We describe the control













Figure 4.2: Route Control Messages: The congested router sends congestion notifi-
cation (CN) message to its route controller (RC:B), and the message is forwarded to
the route controller (RC:A) that can handle the requested message. The multipath
routing (MP) message establishes a tunnel between ingress and egress routers; the
path-pinning message (PP) suppresses route update message from the downstream
domains; and the rate-throttling message (RT) makes responsible routers mark/drop
packets.
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To perform route-control operations, route controllers should (1) have the com-
plete knowledge on the network topology of its domain and (2) be able to establish
a session with BGP routers1. Route controllers can satisfy the first requirement by
either overhearing of or participating in intra-domain routing protocol (i.e., IGP).
The second requirement can be easily configured since the route controller and BGP
routers are under the same administrative control.
4.4.2 Route Management
During flooding attacks, a congested router constructs a traffic tree from the path-
identifiers it has received, whereby source domains and their domain paths (AS
paths) to the congested router are identified. For the path-identifiers collected, the
congested router estimates the proportion of attack traffic that each path-identifier
delivers (by measuring the send rate of each path-identifier), defined as the “domain
contamination.” We will discuss how to estimate domain contamination in section
4.4.3.1. With the path-traffic information gathered as such, the congested router
identifies two sets of domains: (1) highly contaminated domains that forward high
volume of traffic, and (2) highly “influenced” domains that are not contaminated
yet highly affected by attack traffic due to their locales (i.e., share much of their
paths to the destination with attack traffic).
The flows from highly influenced domains are desired to be rerouted; and the
flows from highly contaminated domains to be forwarded on the “pinned” default
1A BGP router is generally configured to establish BGP sessions only with its neighbors to
prevent false route advertisement.
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paths. For rerouting, the congested router sends a reroute request to the route
controller of its domain. A route request consists of the destination address pre-
fix to the congested link and a list of related domains for rerouting, which are
a source/provider (ASS) that preforms rerouting, a preferred incoming domain(s)
(ASPI ) through which rerouted traffic is forwarded, and the congested incoming do-
mains (ASCI ) that need to be avoided. Then, the route request is delivered to the
route controller of ASS. A path-pinning request is sent in the same way, yet it is
delivered to a provider domain that hosts the contaminated domains. The rerout-
ing and path-pinning mechanisms at the source/provider domain is performed as
follows.
4.4.2.1 Domain Discrimination
A congested router identifies contaminated domains that send high volume of attack
traffic by the drop rate of path-identifiers, denoted by DSi (recall that the path-
identifier is the ordered list of ASs through which a packet is forwarded). We
define a path-identifier whose drop-rate exceeds a certain threshold Dth (e.g., Dth
= 10% of allocated bandwidth CSi) as an attack path-identifier, and denote the
set of attack path-identifiers by SA. Then, path-identifiers that (1) traverse the
same AS(s) with attack path-identifiers and (2) send packets at a lower rate than
the allocated bandwidth (CSi), could be highly affected by attacks and need to be
rerouted (named attack-influenced path-identifier). These are formally defined as
follows.
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• S: set of all path-identifiers.
• SA: set of attack path-identifiers,
SA = {Si|DSi > Dth} for Si ∈ S.
• SL: set of legitimate path-identifiers, SL = S − SA
• SI : set of attack-influenced path-identifiers,
SI = {Si|λSi < CSi , Si
⋂
Sj 6= ∅} for Si ∈ SL and Sj ∈ SA.
• lSi : impact length of Si,
lSi = |Si
⋂
Sj| for Si ∈ SL and Sj ∈ SA.
In the above definition, the impact length of legitimate path-identifier Si is
the largest number of AS hops Si shares with an attack path-identifier. This value
will be used in selecting rerouting policies listed below.
4.4.2.2 Rerouting
A route controller, depending on its location (i.e., source or provider), performs
rerouting in different ways.
Source Domain. A source domain can perform rerouting only when it has
multiple AS paths to the requested destination (i.e., is multi-homed). When the
domain controller of a multi-homed source domain receives a reroute message, it
first selects the next-hop AS to which forwarded traffic would reach at the preferred
incoming AS by the congested router. If multiple distinct next-hop ASs satisfying
the reroute request (i.e., multiple AS paths) exist, the route controller selects an
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AS based on the priority described in the route selection process [bgp]. The router
controller sets the selected AS path as the default path for forwarding traffic to the
congested link, by assigning the highest local preference value to the path. (“Local
Preference” has the highest priority in the BGP route decision process.) The local
preference value is set by the BGP router connected to the next-hop AS when
importing route announcements from it; e.g., R′31 in Fig. 4.1(a).
Provider Domain. A reroute request at a provider domain is handled in the
same way as the multi-homed source case if the provider is requested to reroute all
its customers’ traffic. However, if the request is made for a specific set of customer
domains, the provider would set up tunnels for the selected next-hop AS on behalf
of those customers, leaving the default path intact, i.e., multipath routing. While
tunneling can be implemented various ways (e.g., MPLS, IP-in-IP), we use an IP-in-
IP tunneling mechanism in order to implement the tunneling protocol independently
of, yet taking the advantage of a variety of intra-domain routing protocols for load
balancing (multipath routing), service guarantees (e.g., RSVP), and performance
improvement (e.g., MPLS). To do this, the route controller sends a tunneling request
to the ingress router(s) (e.g., R21 in Fig. 4.1(b)) connected to the corresponding
customer domain by providing the destination prefix that needs to be tunneled
and the IP address of the egress router through which the next-hop AS is reached
(Alternatively, the IP address of the next-hop AS’s ingress router can be used for
tunneling.). The ingress router, on receiving the packet whose destination address
matches the prefix requested for tunneling, encapsulate the original IP packet in the
new IP packet destined to the egress router (e.g., R′21 in Fig. 4.1(b)). When the
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egress router receives the packet, it decapsulates (i.e., peels off the outer IP header)
the packet; and forwards the packet to the next-hop AS (we assume that each
egress interface of the egress router has a distinct IP address.). We note that packet
manipulation would not impose much overhead to BGP routers since it only applies
to the flows carrying the requested destination prefixes. We also note that intra-
domain traffic engineering, including potential intra-domain multipath routing (e.g.,
[KKDC05, MEFV08]), could be independently performed while network topology
being kept private to the outside.
Destination Domain. A destination domain, if it has multiple incoming
interfaces with upstream domains at different locations (i.e., border routers), can
reroute legitimate traffic by changing the route export policies of border routers.
Among multiple border routers in the next-hop domain, the upstream domain would
select the router that announced the lowest MED (multiple exit discriminator) value,
as the next-hop router. Hence, a destination domain can shift incoming traffic to a
different path by changing MED values. This destination-based rerouting is most
effective when the upstream domain is the traffic origin (i.e., impact length is 1).
A route controller selects one or combination of the above rerouting policies
based on the AS connectivity and the impact length of a path-identifier; e.g., if the
impact length of a path-identifier is greater than 2, rerouting at source or provider
domain would be more effective.
102
4.4.2.3 Path Pinning
Path-pinning, which can be considered as a tunneling mechanism, aims to nail
down the route of suspicious (attack) flows. When path-pinning is requested by the
route controller of the congested domain, the recipient (the route controller of the
source/provider domain) sets BGP routers to suppress the route update messages
(received from neighboring domains) containing the requested destination prefix.
Route update suppression would make the default path for the destination prefix
unchanged, hence nail down the inter-domain path to the congested link. Meanwhile,
any intra-domain route optimization (e.g., intra-domain multi-path routing) should
not be performed on the flows carrying the requested destination prefix to confine
their side-effects on other legitimate flows. This can be implemented using multi-
topology routing [PMR+07, cis] – for which multiple routing topologies are kept in
a router to forward traffic based on different criteria – by assigning a topology for
this purpose.
As an alternative to the route suppression, a capability scheme can be applied
as follows.
Capability Embedding. Implementing capability scheme [YPS04,YWA05] at
the ingress router at which attack flows arrive would allow only authorized flows
(by capabilities) to take advantage of any intra-domain routing optimization. In
order to trade off the computational overhead of capability validation, we overload
a flow’s routing information into the capability as follows.
An ingress router generates a capability for flow fj by hashing the following
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tuple with its secret key: (IPS, IPD, RID), where IPS is the source IP, IPD is the
destination IP, and RID is the egress router id. That is, fj’s capability at router
Ri is defined as CRi(fj) = RID || Hash(IPS, IPD, RID, KRi). The packet destination
returns this capability to the source for further packet transmission. Hence, address-
spoofed packets or unwanted packets by their destination can be filtered at the
capability-enabled router. We assume that a unique and private (i.e., meaningful
within the domain) RID can be assigned to BGP routers of a domain and each RID
can be mapped to the IP address of the corresponding router. Once a packet passes
capability validation at the ingress router (i.e., authorized), it would be directed to
the egress router distinguished by the RID in the capability.
4.4.3 Rate Throttling
4.4.3.1 Rate Allocation
As our defense mechanism is intended to favor flows from uncontaminated domains,
distinguishing such domains from contaminated ones is essential. Of course, a con-
gested router is able to allocate more resource (e.g., bandwidth, buffer space) for the
traffic from preferred domains, yet difficulty in resource allocation arises if attack
traffic is destined for public services and hence no preference regarding the traffic
origins can be made. While a fair bandwidth allocation to all active domains would
be a viable approach, it is less effective if attack sources are distributed in a large
number of domains.
Estimating the proportion of attack flows originating from a domain (defined
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as the domain contamination) enables a congested router to differentially allocate
link bandwidth according to the domain contamination. Generally, domain contam-
ination could be inferred by the aggregate transmission rate and/or a test on the
“protocol compliance” (e.g., TCP congestion control, completion of TCP’s three-
way handshake) of the flows originating from a domain. Additionally, we engage a
domain’s compliance with the packet marking request – denoted by “policy compli-
ance” – in router’s bandwidth allocation to reward policy compliant domains. This
reward policy is both desirable and effective: it is desirable because reward would en-
courage source-end defense, which mitigates collateral damage to legitimate traffic;
and it is effective because source domains can identify attack sources more precisely.
Let Si be the path-identifier that represents a source domain, and S be the set
of all active path-identifiers seen at the congested router. And, let λSi be the send
rate of packets carrying Si and C be the capacity of the congested link. Given λSi
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where ρSi = min{ λSiCSi , 1}, |S
H | is the number of over-subscribing domains (i.e.,




The first term in Eq. (A-1) is the guaranteed bandwidth to Si (denoted by
C0Si), and the second term is the rewarded bandwidth to Si on its policy compliance
(denoted by C1Si). The guaranteed bandwidth to Si is determined as such (i.e.,
C
|S|),
in order to allocate the same (guaranteed) bandwidth to all domains. Whenever
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the guaranteed bandwidths are not fully subscribed (e.g., some domains send less
traffic than the guaranteed amount), the router has residual capacity that could
be reallocated. This residual capacity is C − ∑Si∈S C|S|ρSi and is reallocated to
Si proportional to its rate-control compliance PSi – differential bandwidth reward.
Thus, source domains that limit send rate to the congested link could be allocated
additional bandwidth that would be unavailable otherwise.
4.4.3.2 Packet Marking
The congested router sends a packet-marking request (which implicitly requires
rate-throttling) to the source/provider domains whose transmission rate exceeds
the allocated bandwidth (i.e., λSi > CSi). The packet-marking request includes two
threshold values: the guaranteed bandwidth (Bthmin =
C
|S|) and the overall assigned
bandwidth (Bthmax = CSi). On the request, the egress router of the source domain
(or ingress router of the provider domain) writes high priority markings (i.e., 0)
on the packets at a rate of Bthmin and low priority markings (i.e., 1) at a rate of
Bthmax−Bthmin. And, it would either drop remaining non-markable packets to comply
the rate-control policy of the destination or write lowest priority markings (i.e., 2)
on them.
4.4.3.3 Rate Control
A congested router implements separate token buckets to provide bandwidth guar-
antees to path-identifiers. Each token-bucket (for a domain) consists of two sub-
106
buckets: a high-priority token bucket (denoted by HTSi) for the guaranteed band-
width (i.e., C0Si) and a low-priority token bucket (denoted by LTSi) for the rewarded
bandwidth (i.e., C1Si). The router controls the bandwidth of each path-identifier
(domain) by applying the following packet admission policy. Let SL and SA be
the set of legitimate and attack path-identifiers respectively. And, let Q(t) be the
current length of the high-priority queue and its (desired) normal operating range
be [Qmin, Qmax]
2.
A packet is placed in the high priority queue if its path-identifier belong to
1. Legitimate Path and
• a token is available in HTSi , or
• a token is available in LTSi and Q(t) 6 Qmax, or
• Q(t) 6 Qmin.
2. Priority-Marking Attack Path and
• marking is 0 and a token is available in HTSi , or
• marking is 1 and a token is available in LTSi and Q(t) 6 Qmax.
3. Non-Marking Attack Path and
• high-priority token is available.
Thus, HTSi provides bandwidth guarantees to domains, and LTSi allows the
residual bandwidth to be utilized by legitimate and priority-marking domains. Yet,
2Qmax is chosen to limit the maximum queueing delay and Qmin is chosen to allow instantaneous
traffic burst. These values are assumed to be set by the router.
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the router grants the tokens for the residual bandwidth (LTSi) only when Q(t)
stays in a normal operating range (i.e., Q(t) 6 Qmax), in order to handle instan-
taneous or potential traffic increase by the under-subscribing domains (which are
allocated the same guaranteed bandwidth, namely C|S|). Whenever Q(t) goes below
the minimum operating range (i.e., Q(t) 6 Qmin), the router enqueues the packets
of legitimate paths regardless of token availability, to avoid link under-utilization
during the flooding attacks (we set Qmin = 20 % of the queue size in our simulation).
This bandwidth control mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Rate Limiting at a Congested Router.
Packets that have lowest priority marking (2) are placed in the legacy queue
(for non-prioritized, legacy3 traffic), which would be serviced only when the high-
priority queue is empty. If the drop rate of a path-identifer exceeds a certain
threshold (e.g., 10% of allocated bandwidth), it would be classified as an attack
3The packets that originate from non-path marking domains are denoted by “Legacy” packets
and have low service priority at the congested domain.
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path-identifier, and be requested rate-throttling.
4.4.4 Control Message Format
In this subsection, we describe the route-control message in detail. We show the
message format in Fig. 4.4 and explain each field of the message below.




Msg 2 TS Duration Sign of CD
ASS: Source Domain, ASD: Congested Domain, TS: Timestamp
Figure 4.4: Control Message Format.
• ASS: Source Domain of the flows that need to be controlled.
• ASD: Congested Domain. The congested router sets this field to its id (which
is uniquely assigned within the domain) when sending a congestion notification
message to the route controller. Then, the route controller replaces the id with
its own AS number and send the message to the route controller of SD.
• Addr. Prefix: Destination address prefix(es) of the flows that contribute con-
gestion.
• Msg Type: Control message type. Each of Multipath routing (MP), Path-
pinning (PP), Rate-Throttling (RT), and Revocation (REV) messages are as-
signed one bit from the lowest bit.
• Control Msg 1 and 2: These fields have different meanings depending on the
message type. The message types and corresponding meanings (of Msg 1 and
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Msg 2 separated by comma) are as follows.
MP - domains through which packets are routed (ASPI ), domains to be avoided
(ASCI ).
PP - current AS path, unused




• TS: message creation time. TS is used to prevent replay attacks.
• Duration: duration of the route control. TS + Duration is the expiration time
of the route-control request.
• Sign of CD: Digital signature of the control message signed by the congestion
domain.
In the above message format, SD, Addr. Prefix, and Control Msgs fields
can have multiple entries, hence the first byte of those fields used to indicate the
number of entries. Inter-domain route-control messages (i.e., those between route
controllers) are protected by a digital signature scheme (e.g., RSA, ECC signatures)
for the authenticity and integrity of the message. And, intra-domain messages are
protected by the message authentication code (MAC) that is generated using a pre-
shared secret key between the route controller and each router in the same domain.
We assume that every route controller has a private/public key pair certified by a
trusted third party (e.g., ICANN), and shares secret keys with individual routers
of its domain. When a route controller receives a route control message from the
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congested router, the route controller verifies the MAC of the request and replaces
the MAC with its signature if the MAC is correct.
4.5 Simulation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our scheme under various simulation
scenarios using ns2. For simulations, we configure a network topology as illustrated
in Fig. 4.5 and set various types of traffic (e.g., FTP, CBR, and Web traffic) to
go through backbone links (i.e., background traffic)) to approximate real network
condition.
Topology. Source domains (S1, . . ., S6) and a destination domain (D) are
attached to the provider domains (P1, P2, P3) and intermediate domains on the
path (R1, . . ., R7) connect them with two disjoint paths: P1 to P3 and P2 to
P3. S1, S2, and S3 are attached to P1 and S4, S5 S6 are attached to P2. We set
the bottleneck link capacity (i.e., the link between P3 and D) to 100 Mbps and
the capacities of remaining links to 500 Mbps. In the topology, S3 has multiple
providers (i.e., P1, P2) that have disjoint paths to the destination domain. The
path between P1 and P3 is connected by three routers (each router represents an
AS in our simulation) and the path between P2 and P3 is connected by four routers
with higher link delays. Hence, S3 chooses P1 as the default next hop AS to the
destination (we set this in our simulation by assigning lower link costs on S3’s path
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Figure 4.5: Simulation Topology
Traffic. To approximate real network-traffic conditions, we set Web (packet
arrivals with Pareto distribution), FTP, and CBR (Constant Bit Rate) traffic to
pass through the core network (denoted by Ri’s), which also delivers the flows whose
bandwidth we want to observe (i.e., flows between Si’s and D for 1 6 i 6 6). We
generate 300 Mbps Web traffic, 50 Mbps CBR traffic, and FTP flows originating from
three different domains (i.e., three distinct paths seen at R1 and R4) for background
traffic. We attach 30 FTP sources to each of source domains for generating legitimate
flows, each of which sends 5 MB files to the destination D. Then, we measure the
flows’ bandwidth at the (attack) target link. As TCP flows adapt their send rate to
available bandwidth and hence are highly vulnerable to link flooding attacks, their
bandwidth at the congested link would reflect the worst effect of flooding attacks.
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4.5.1 Multipath Routing
We place attack sources at two domains, namely S1 and S2, and configure the
attack sources of each domain to collectively send 200 Mbps Web traffic (which can
exhaust the bandwidth of the target link (100 Mbps) and the available bandwidth
on the path to congestion controlling flows (i.e., 150 Mbps)). And, we set S5 and
S6 send 10 Mbps traffic to observe how the under-subscribed bandwidth by those
domains is re-allocated to other domains. The congested router (i.e., D) is enabled
to perform per-path fair bandwidth control using a token-bucket mechanism [Par92]
(where individual paths are assigned separate token buckets), and remaining routers
implement drop-tail queues to model the legacy part of the network. To show the
advantage of differential bandwidth allocation to the rate-limiting source domain,
S2 is enabled to control the rate of outgoing traffic as requested by the congested
router, while S1 forwards all packets destined to D to P1.
Fig. 4.6(a) shows the result of the scenario where S3 forwards traffic to the
default next hop AS (i.e., P1). While the per-path bandwidth control at router P3
limits the bandwidth of S1 (i.e., attack domain) effectively, the high-rate traffic of S1
significantly affects the TCP flows originating from S3. Meanwhile, rate-controlling
domain S2 uses more bandwidth than S1 (though less than that of legitimate domain
S4) since the congested router D allocates the guaranteed amount of bandwidth to
S1 and S2 (which is 100 Mbps / 6 paths = ≈ 16.7 Mbps) yet allocates the part of
the under-subscribed bandwidth by S5 and S6 (which is 33.4 Mbps - 20 Mbps =
13.4 Mbps and is reallocated to S2, S3 and S4) to S2. As illustrated in the figure,
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(c) Default Path with PBW



























(d) Alternate Path with PBW
Figure 4.6: Bandwidth used by individual source domains at the congested link
when the send rate of the attack domain (i.e., S1) is 200 Mbps. PBW stands for
global deployment of path-bandwidth control at routers.
the Web traffic (which generally consists of short-lived TCP flows, e.g., flows from
S2) is less affected by the flooding attack than long TCP flows (i.e., FTP flows of
S1).
To protect the flows of S3, we employ multi-path routing at S3, thereby S3
routes its traffic heading to D via P2. Fig. 4.6(b) shows that the bandwidth of S3 is
similar to that of S4 and bandwidth of all domains are stable when compared with
the result of the single-path scenario: the variation of the bandwidth of S4 becomes
lower since the bandwidth allocation at the congested router is stable (Router D
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reallocates the under-utilized bandwidth by S1 to S4 in the previous simulation.).
To evaluate the effectiveness of multipath routing, we compare the result of
multipath routing with that of global deployment of per-path bandwidth control
at all routers (i.e., R1 to R7). As illustrated in Fig. 4.6(c), global per-path (fair)
bandwidth control allows more bandwidth to legitimate domains (S3, S4) since it
limits (1) the bandwidth of attack traffic near its origin and (2) the bandwidth of
background traffic which could increase instantaneously (e.g., at 27 second in Fig.
4.6(b)). When both multipath routing and per-path bandwidth control are employed
(viz., Fig. 4.6(d), the bandwidths of legitimate domains become more stable (i.e.,
less fluctuate over time) as they are less affected by the background traffic. Though
effective, per-path bandwidth control cannot be easily deployed globally (considering
the number of routers in the Internet) and would be less practical at the Internet
backbone where a large number of flow-paths exist. Note that our multipath routing
mechanism can be implemented at the Internet edges (i.e., stub/provider domains),
hence does not require global change of routers.
Fig. 4.7(a) shows the simulation result of more aggressive attacks, where the
aggregate send rate of attack domain is increased by 50% (i.e., 300 Mbps per attack
domain). Increasing attack strength reduces the bandwidth of S1 more significantly
in the absence of multipath routing or global per-path bandwidth control. Like the
previous result, multipath routing protects the flows of S3 from flooding (viz., Fig.
4.7(b). Yet, the bandwidths of S3 and S4 fluctuate due to the background traffic on
the path between R4 and R7. This effect disappears when per-path bandwidth con-
trol is employed (viz., Fig. 4.7(d)). Fig. 4.8 compares the proportion of bandwidth
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(c) Default Path with PBW



























(d) Alternate Path with PBW
Figure 4.7: Bandwidth used by individual source domains at the congested link
when the send rate of the attack domain is 300 Mbps.
used by each domain for different attack rates and defense strategies.
4.5.2 Effects of Attack-Path Change
We illustrate the potential effects of attack-route changes on legitimate traffic when
the intermediate routers on forwarding paths do not perform per-path bandwidth
control (if they do, attack effects would be limited as illustrated in the previous
section.). For this simulation, we place attack sources at S3 (which is multi-homed


















































Figure 4.8: Bandwidth used by source domains at the congested link.
Legend: SP: Single-path Routing, MP: Multi-path Routing, SPP: SP with global
per-path bandwidth control, MPP: MP with global per-path bandwidth control.
The numbers following dashes represent the send rate of each attack domain.
30 seconds. We simulate this path change in ns2 by employing the DV (Distance
Vector) routing protocol and increasing the link cost between S3 and P1. We place
FTP sources in the other domains and observe their bandwidth at the congested
link. We run simulations for the attack strengths of 400 Mbps and 500 Mbps, and
compare the results with those of the simulations where (attack) path-pinning is
enabled.
Fig. 4.9(a) and 4.9(c) show that the bandwidths of S4, S5 and S6 decrease
significantly after attack route change occurs at t = 30 seconds even though the
bandwidth of attack traffic is limited at the congested link. Route changes of attack
traffic not only affect the flows that head to the target link but could possibly affect
more legitimate flows (that have different destinations from attack traffic) since the
alternate path chosen by a domain would be longer than the default path (recall
that the path that has the shortest AS hops to the destination is chosen as a default
path in BGP protocol). That is, attack effects are not confined within a specified
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(a) Route Change under a 400 Mbps attack



























(b) Path Pinning under a 400 Mbps attack



























(c) Route Change under a 500 Mbps attack



























(d) Path Pinning under a 500 Mbps attack
Figure 4.9: Comparison of bandwidths used by individual source domains at the
congested link for different attack send rates (i.e., 400 Mbps and 500 Mbps) and
different routing policies (i.e., single-path and multi-path routing).
locale (neighboring domains) but are dispersed widely. In contrast, when the route




Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we conclude this dissertation and discuss directions for future re-
search.
5.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have presented a comprehensive scheme that localizes the
effects of link-flooding attacks with various respects and hence provides depend-
able link access (i.e., guarantees of link access) during the flooding attacks. We
summarize the constituting mechanisms and reiterate our contributions below.
• First, we presented a new path identification mechanism that provides un-
forgeable domain identifiers to individual packets. Path-identifiers carried
in packets enable remote routers to identify packets’ domain of origin and
help localize the effects of flooding attacks by employing per-domain based
countermeasures. Our path identification mechanism is designed to be inde-
pendently and incrementally deployed at the Internet edges (e.g., stub ASs)
and its source-constructible nature eliminates the global deployment issue of
previous packet marking schemes.
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• Second, we presented a dynamic virtual queueing and path aggregation mech-
anisms that provide guarantees for network link access to capability request
packets. These guarantees are provided in a domain basis, hence DoC attacks
from contaminated domains, even if they are launched by a large number of
bots, would not affect the link-access guarantees of legitimate capability re-
quests that originate from uncontaminated domains. Simulation results in
Section 2.7 show the strength of our scheme: precise guarantees independent
of attack size and location, differential guarantees based on domain contami-
nation, and resilience against timed attacks (e.g., Rolling attack).
• Third, we presented a per-domain bandwidth control mechanism called “FLoc”
that provides precise bandwidth guarantees to the aggregate-flows of the same
origin. In addition to the bandwidth guarantees, our mechanism can iden-
tify and rate-limit a variety of attack flows: flows of non-responsive/high-rate
attacks, low-rate Shrew attacks, and more sophisticated “covert attacks” de-
scribed in Section 3.4.2.3. Comprehensive simulations under those attack sce-
narios and comparisons of the results with those of other mechanisms show
the effectiveness and robustness of FLoc especially for defending against the
low-rate and covert attacks.
• Finally, we presented a complementary routing system that reroutes legiti-
mate traffic via less congested paths using the path multiplicity of the Internet.
Meanwhile, pinning the paths that deliver attack traffic prevents attack disper-
sion, hence localizes their effects. We implemented those functions by slightly
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modifying the current routing policies at network edges (i.e., BGP routers),
in order to make them easily adopted. In addition to the routing policies, the
bandwidth reward policy applied at the congested router provides incentive for
source-end defense that is essential for reducing the undesirable side-effects of
flooding attacks (e.g., multiple congested links). Our simulation results illus-
trate the effects of flooding attacks on legitimate flows and how those effects
are mitigated by our routing policies.
5.2 Future Work
Implementation. In this dissertation, we evaluated the effectiveness of our
scheme by ns2 simulations. In addition, we plan to implement our scheme in a real
system and evaluate its performance with real Internet traffic traces. This would
provide more solid confidence on our scheme and its deployment benefit.
Economic Cost of Defense. Obstacles for deploying a new scheme range
from the complexity of the scheme (i.e., in terms of resource requirement) to its
economic cost. We will make a quantitative analysis on the economic cost of security-
enhanced (meaning DoS-resilient) router design and deployment, and their cost-
effectiveness. This also help identify essential functionalities that a new scheme
needs to be equipped and places where the scheme should be deployed.
Intra-domain Extension. Our design mostly focuses on identifying and rate-
limiting attack traffic in a domain basis, and leave how those traffic is handled at
their origin as the responsibility of corresponding domains. We will extend our
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scheme to be applicable within a (source) domain so that attack sources are located
and their traffic is confined more precisely at their origin.
Reliability of Control Messages. The authenticity as well as the integrity of
control messages must be guaranteed in our collaborative defense mechanism. In
addition, reliability on the requested messages (e.g., fair bandwidth allocation) is
required for the recipient to take requested actions. We will design a control-message
validation mechanism, whereby a recipient of control messages can ascertain whether
a valid control request has been made by the message sender (i.e., router controller
of a flooded domain).
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